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. , ,'., "throughoUt the' pertbr.! oP':Cha' Fll~h ·ltefntbl1cf t.fti~frUlce. 
there ha~ beeain4ie •• lft, .peeut.rloif;:ci~Be.rnl!11 :'th. drt.atl. 
tation 6t' "rench tc,ret.p' poliCY ~ 'A :I"'at· 4eat ,,'uncertatnty 
.xtjt.toda1~"JJi tht ·w.'t "".thet'· to approve of or to condemn 
the indip..s.nt 'lnttt.att.vi.·of~·h-•• la.t d'aault.lnbter-
~ti.6nai' poililt':~' ThelsS~t"l'''_.t aedt. Wtih 'eoft.ttf.red 
In the'eont*2tt ot'~th.li.t.w •• t .trudl.~'·1'hl': r •••• reb.· 
th.r.f~e;\·h'" .ti~i" (eo ~ro'ilh.;f:r.alltt"·;.r·~· thi 
Gaultt''tpo't.II.Oft 'Ul tlu" "Cold War. II Certain funda.ental 
que.ti~.pl~.dtll. 4tJ:ec;iJ~ft. ,!*,~~h. ~~t~,":,#!'''re~,~J~l'~d I 
What a,. Ch.r;.~a#a,,~~t~~; •• ~at ~~! 'lijd:.,b~i4it~~! ;'~of 
French,;:t, .. ,te,..a :.pol~cyt.' :~'~1~' #~ec ;~..,~ft~,'"'t!l'''~ A~ 
initia~" •• '" .,., at ~~., .. ,tm,',*ti": tlt~y ;a~d"l'hl h.:~:'., J '. 
<" " ',~ •• < •• ' , ; '~"./' "~', '" "" ,. 11<:.-' 'r' > .'~',';; ~.'.~" '_ '_, ~ ~4 ,~.~. 
the •• D\t.tl.A.l .. ,\;b •• ,,~.ptded;b1"".',.'" 8tttt.'~f~~an or 
pro-soVt.~t, Wtiat"~t,~~i~:~;"'~ ~.";~Jqrid:: by', d.~.~ll.;, 
" ' '" .'<' Ii .. >" ;.' _.,. . t '" .- "~~'.i: . _ ,.";, ' " ., <' :" • \ ~.I'i 
to lDlp~~t',,". ,P011Cy"~,~":"",,, '~~"~'~"}~~h 
.ffort.bid, WMt " hI'. ""th.~'~e.t .. ( of' the: Imen 1'1'0 
th ••• ~lt,f ~,~-t:'IIJj&l; l=~~,~. ~\t.IJ~ 
end8ftt(,ft_b,' ,,: ti:,'h"'f!'.·h- . '.',1.:, of·tnn,· ,'"., "'4Iil,' , ....... . p ,'.,' ,,~, 0r:,-;",:, ,. ~,.~Of'I""" .ee ...... ...... 
. ,. .., !.' -, '.' ,', ". ."" ", ' 
the othel' ftatioftl of trw.: *ld? What impact. 1.f an),. have 
·':t ••.• , 
I 
the.e lDltlatl.VM •• e .Il' the "Cold Wa ... " .ltuatlcmtn world 
pol lll.e. , 
The ~i~ ~loY"tn tht •• ' rou ... ch vere ~e.crlptl\t. 
au analytlc" th~ 'ubj~t( .att." had· to be' rir.c' apProached 
cleacJ:lplf:ftl,. ba ... to .. tahti.h" • ,\tIflelent body ol' 
faetual data to ~t fruitful" co~t~.u'l~;;" "l~ :."4.n1,' 
-i- 'r ," 
~. thia .... _reh proe ..... lla _ .. lYtl.e ~"'ln 
an .ffoR toCleve~~ .OM tti-17 .f aaul1l,tfonlp 'pollcy. 
~ . '" " ",: , "If· • 'J ':'<~ l' ,"', ." 
fbi. til"", then aen.t a. a """el.ndetebl.ftlft'the 
.Ucee.. of ~bt lorelp ,olley. \" " ,,:i"';' " 
: ;' •. ';"': '.'. . . ,',\; .• . i. ,>".' .;,.' "" '. .' :~.~ 'i"" -~' ~~ ." ".;_,.~ 
In any iueh'·,tucly. cere ....... .,tiem .... t he .... 
bet ..... 'the r .... nh' 1. abl. to" pHeeedl"" thi. re.~~h wa. 
no'dlfferent.' Th~: '-latlon of d.eba.lc'.,.l' ~, ~1'1 
, • $, 'J 11 "1"1' r J l' I' '. UI. t .. ,I 1'1 I. 
rna its.. ..... 11 ... _In ............. ba •• 
•• O.1I11e' .......... ua With h~"" 1. _ ... _1, .•• well 
a. 1\1 ............. Co ....... haG.·. ..'len ..... u.&o.,. 
lIa.o .. f~. .. aau11., hal el ... tp ...... 1fl .. hy . 
pol1,,0.1 ph~ ...... ~h .. hl.l I.,..., ••. hu • ..,.""", ,oa1tlon 
car.. U.k.11" Iha.,tak,ea .".··.' ...... ,,011 ..... ' 'ttl ..... ,. 
who, .• n, ....... ' .. ~1" . ·,.1' ..... 1 ... 1L1t ..... 2, .. lal1-
.... d.icleoloaY·tra1' ... pUe ....... ' ....... 1 ....... 1 
.,pl, .. atiou w' .... Uullvlaal ... c . ..,. ....... ' ......... " • 
... .. lb •.. ,,-,_ul.-." "_1"" ill ,1M ....... Unal· 
", '! - .~. ~, • - • 
81''' •... 'l"laU,......, ..... lly ,1 ........... .-.&. ..... t
.b... ..... t:t..onal ol'Clu _uta in an aqu11Um._ of 
fon ..... "".1..., ""'""~ ..... l.hatl,i ....... ""i ... ,,,. 
_~1," b ... oall .... 3 " " . ;., <', 
,~ ........ til'" ... -,-.1 ·,f •• ......n •.• a.tll. 
1M11 ..... that ~ ... al .... 'l .... _Cbe ............ ' 
" -' " "" .' . " '.,' '_. . 
~"".,If ... c~;._"tt be~nc" ......... ~ ..... ' •• ...., ..... 
.... ... ill 1 .. ~ .. U .. ,.. ..... ,,<a.,~ ... lllle.l ·, .. liM 
b~l~ ....... u. ....... -, cIo), 1IMI't .... ~ ... -
-... - ?'hr-" a1~,""',:Ud.4 _:AIIIC1 _.1 •.•.. lie 
... ~ .·trh4"td.Dlba~,. ,III."", ...... 1<.1 ..... :
Ill ....... ~1 ..... ., • .,.l1qil"".f ......·0 ... 1 
• • • I 
4 
... etNld· ........ 1Jt.tff_ 1Mltveea •• 1 .. w .. e if 
.~. ccNl.t·'he ..... bit ...... ltd. ...... titCo'the 
.... pee.I ... ,«08Olftt.6 -" ",tl.t.o .. t.fn:1IC~of hoth id .. ·
olOitAal eampa, .ftieno~tt.h pac:t 0_1. MiaftC.tbe 
scal •• Mtween CM lI.8 •• 'U.S.S.R. h«I • ......". a ,..elbl. 
py_~ paet.-ld unlt.~pe ••• "tbird' I .... ·, 
"" • ,..lble 'h~et: pee' ooulcitNalaae* tIb4t'Aqlo-
S .... MgIllt!W.7l1y ami .eh_k the ~ ........ "Whleb .tt .... 
mati.,. rr.ttee eboel" "8 "bot .tpillet._ '0 •• h.W .. of 
,._., What 1 ••• i ... 'U IMI .,... ....... s. tiel' ,... •• la. 
m"" ... 11_l alfain .... _tldalR:~ .... t.¥lduat· ,.. 
. De' <lbtJ..· ..... l_'l •• f eeI .... t .. '.,t.IIlW.t,. 
.e .. at IMfttto 1'956. ,.",. ""'.atf.llWtatt_ "...'. 
lMl."'" a pottt't..Ht-.hlw· aMldld' not .. t1ftIIeltoef. 
~.' t".e~t.t. ·.~tbt, 'It .. " .. tt. ... thal Pe''''-
.. ',,-uy eeuld ••. t.e .... _ftdl: 1flth·Ibl ..... lti ..... . 
..." haft uped ........... 10" tea . ,..1 ..... ft .... .. 
hal tatleat" • ge .. t· ...... ., lb.' ....... ' ta ...  
...... Bun,. (.1~1t Itteft ·W •• tl11 ..... tat ....... 
i.oW .. "ell"t .. l ........ "'de .. 1' ......... f· "Nl11na 
walt ~ .. ) .. 1M ~l ... c4N1 ... 'HapI' ..... 
• f --tas ••.. ,.. lB I ...... Fnlce ... _.,. •. ' <~f.lal 
t'h.l. toes ., tty ..... , .. w •• ""Sfiat 'plyit" ....... 11 .. 
withlft !'he ~'.t~d, • -pint W'ht.." _if ..... 'It.elf 
_t'~ettlfl'1,. '111 the 1lfte.a.l\Wlet rift.·, ,.... tld. 
• ....... , of the eoa.unt..t world De Gaull. concluded that 
• <" ~ -, ' • • • • 
the al.ttaa bal~. of ~ wa. U'J'm4tt.a:al. preoarloua •. 
and UIIWl... 'l'ltua ,he f~e1an poll.cy of france .1, ~p. for: 
revl.~o. at Che t~ When de Gaulle a •• uned power in 1958. 
1.'he broad object!:" of 'l'ftfteh foz-elsn pol1cy had to 
be r .... s ••• ed in light of eontemponYy need.. The fol1owlna 
objectives ~e loemulated under the Fifth Republic a. the 
polley-goals. national lndependenea, reunif~c.tlon of 
Europe "from the Atlantic to the Urals·, economic and cul-
tural advancement) .ecurlt)'1 &quality or pre.tlge. By 
811ow1.. .. sltuatiou to ctevelop and _tUG .1owly, by _,,1. 
fe8tlnl f()rc. and vi.,. and yet ...... ud .• nexlbl •• by 
takins advantage of the dlploastie blunders of other powers, 
de Gaulle has .et out upon a cour.. Which ha. .chi.... a 
desr.. of independence for Franee, but at the .... time hal 
aucceeded in llolatll'll Frane_ from the eonacmeue of W •• tem 
fore 18ft policy. By eaterlna upon a complete napproaohment 
with the Soviet Vlti.em, cia C.ulle cO'IJld galn for France con-
alderab!e economic advanta.... andt.ncrfltlefttatton of Prench 
pre.tiSe in the non-allgned worl4, and a rea.onable degree 
of secur1ty owing to It. atrateglc a80araphlcal poaitlon. 
The Soviet Union. on the other haMt eould seeura a d811111t1" 
ackncnr1edgemeat of the .11111 .ISlA lD Europe, lac ..... ed 
econom1e oppol,'tuftltl ••• aftCI eeeul'lty from a potentlally. 
potent German milltarl... Oe Caull. :reallze., however, that 
to commlt Franee to any agreement that wou1d be acceptable to 
the Soviets at this ttme would nec.aearlly involve a s«crifice 
6 
of his positton in the West--. poSition which he baa .trugsled 
to attain d\u'1ng the put e1ght ""1'8. Thus such • comple,e 
accord could not be reconciled with the funcl81l'Mlll1tal objecti".s 
of his forat.gn polley. 
',",' ,; 
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~ '., • . .", " .t., 'w' : .' '" ' 
"~.utl:~, eta .. l ...... l~., •• , .. 'l-c;:q-.. la •• ; heau. 
: .' ,'<" , \ ' , -I,. ~ ;;, ,;' ~., ' > ~,~:<:", ' 
.1 a ~k.l~,.~l.~,),.",,~.: .. ~,,~ .... "..,.. '-~~ 
... . I~ ... .... ' bf, 4e :,~1,,~.16 .TO", ,<Ja.11 •• , ht..~ 
~1, .... ,...l~& ~.'1""""'~~";~ .".~tt.a;a,,~c~ .. __ ;, R.~~,~l" 
, , . ."".'" ,,". ') '" ~, ,., ,.' . 
,,~ .• ~~.:;)~, ~\~ ~"1 .. I~, '4IC!..,.1~--" of,;. 
r. .... ~.,.,.,.:~ .... ~ ~~.~l. ,the,~' "'~f,c .. ~'~~t5' 
s,w-.. ,~\\~~1, :~~; '.s ~",~~, .~~ ~ftM~~rt,~~, '.: 
~,~t;~ ~ ~', .. ,.,l •. e_i,~,~,:~ ""l.Il)("'~.I. 
, ~, ", . ',' .~ -- ',' . "";" • " \ , .' " • • - ,< 
.,.tpaa~~"~,">.~ 1.,..~"',~U.f~tt ~ .~~ .. Cha~ 
.' ~ • ",., ~ "',, :;.. ,~ "c. ! .. , . _ ",_ " .." :. " . ~ '" 
c;t. ~~\, ~\4 .... " ...,. .... eoattMnt ... _ld 
.. ~ " . " ,~" ' '" ",,' :, " 
1If.nlal .. ., ','~.V .... ~~~~ ~~;.,*~~" .. ~P,hl '1'-
hll..q:~~~,,~~~tt7·::,tJfl. ;., ••. ;~ ~~ .... t. 
Mq. l!~.}'t~!~,,~,~.,~I~;:_~~: ~;~ t1IH 
ftO l.~i\,~.~"~~~,:,,,.:':-~~~ .. ! ,,,,.~!,:"~'. 
;:' '·'etAl ... ani. .. la ~ eaf ............. 
=t,.=·· .. ::k.~.=.':~lr.IJ~.!:"'...,. 
. ~.~.~.l~ .. ~.. . ~ ".'.' ~~=fr,=5:'".Il:'=J:..~ .. ~ .. 
..... :~ .• ".:.:,,;~.,., .•. , ""', . ",. " .'. x. 
I , ' F II" ... IIbI U • • II . II .. I' 
'" ... ls.z.... .. , .1' ....... w...,.'!., .. ,.,J64. 
~'t_. /,"':'~ •. ': 
,.' :':,11 !,,,.'," ' ,.","" : ' 
:.4~',A. ~lll •. "The fruth R •• f: .... CS. of HlaIt.,." 
AUla, vol. la. '(1914), '.,. ..... ' ,:,:- ; 
:' t'qtoill Ii ... ··,. ..... ~.lIm • .. ,. ('.IVr . 
- - ~ ':', -.'.~~ '" ,::,,~., :' ";,,' " ' ' .. 
1)" ultbta hila"'''1 to bl."l7a1ld _e,o" .. te.,. ••• Gaull. 
ba •• fICtUHd 'tfteallegt..eOf .., ftOIt ·NehtM nah .... the 
l.tt~ 1!tftals _11. ... that paft'f.otl ..... 'tWt the --..1,. of 
ali)" 'illItef.t1, t ; e1a...... ,ell.tda' ,.rtJ.h ...... t.ou.t, 
.trcrH'to W'",. Mtr" ., ..... whOle ....... 1 ,. •• ~19 
''ft. ••• tae"""'t wbteb JHt ...... 1.11. hat ... .,.... 
t. ba." ':.,.. 7ftt. I-enl _1 ... 011 the nature of the uts..cm-
atate ad tt. rot" .. wrid l'O1. ttle' ~"'fhl •• It., ,i ......... 
•• :the ' •• e4!trnM:. and lfte1Mfl:" IoN 0' i .... l.tl_,/~' __ 
fa~'"a •• m"led'''' dicatd.li ........ fft ..... ,Ili ........ -.; 
., .'utteUt" •• ttn,: •• ""''''dl.h':ll ...... ;~ ....... t •• 
ad. '~. a4 Obey.20 .. olea"l' .ht ... t of d. oau11.' • 
......... C, .,'''''.:,. ... ':, •• 8t .. ··' ••• t.'· ..... ' .... ""'an 
~ : • • " . ~ • '- ";". " ~. '. ,..f.!! { • ~t ., . '. , 
the foil<:~"'~~ ", . '.':'" ,'1 ,.,."" . 
~ .: '.: • .?if.f... :;~~~, ;r ~.' 
~o:l~'~rl~"':" '.' ~/::',':m':.:r 
,. ' Zt.: .... ~ ,kufir.,'·· .... ' .. *.1'. UN' _J.y.iIft,..." .. · "," ," .. , _1"..1'- ... 
if. :;;.t "=~..~~tit,. .. w;,_,=.·rr .• p· -.'. Z. '.' '£!.tt."'· .......... 'b. •• 
,a' " ......• tt. ... " ... 'the· ...... ·:., ,"~. 
,-Ct,:,., ... :.,', ":,' .... , ,","': .... 
.. ,' .... ~.: ..... ", "·.*",,~.t.t.. ,... .... ,... 
Id .• wr~~,,,,,"tI~~~"·~"~~~l~r1,, •. "tt~!·.~ , 
, .,', .". ' ,[ 'j ".,",' , - • 
from ~ _ef .. ~ha~ ~ ,"It_ ,'.i.bad: M' .......... 
• ' • ' • ' j;,: '. i,t '. _," " ~,.' ., ,: . , : ,!. ., :': 
PI'.'1~ ,r "..~: ". *~·pe.c. ~'t ~ .... ,M,.. 
~,', . . ".' ~ '.. ,~ - " ':,., ", !" ", 
f,.- "~ 
• , 1 JJ 1 II t, ,t $ t,1 t - U' i . 1 1 ITt U 
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.h ......... f ..... M ..... ·b .... 'to _ematt .... !ht • 
.... " .. , ....... s..ptllttfttly eoMftUed, it ..... .. 
• ... •• II_at& .... , OMtltl.t1 petttleatftUOfttttl. til 
ad.·" ..,_tal ft ........ hl • .." tebe podlhl •• the 
_____ ........ , ... f~.;""l.,.' "l.~ ...... 
... ••• _." And U t ....... eCllldI ..... 'Whleb •• ' 0.111. hl.' . 
"f",s.. __ :., ... ',.," .... 1.21 ' . ',.~ 
....... ooe ..... ' .... tl ..... .,fend t/hO,,·whO at" 
w.., ebIIU ........ a' .1.1....,. .. theHi'1'«'11t1.at '. C!fmMtt.Ofta 
...... : .. 111._ .... c. t ........ polle"... A:t7PI~.t .0" ....... ' 
W' .... , I.ftcI.aMll '" ... ' •• 11 ....... h4b •• of: ,.left.loft : . 
........ ,'", 
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til 111M" Ihu .t.,~t .... Wl& ... t.t ..... C.~ ,bet "Or" 
hall.- .,,-"-call ..... _e. .. ~1.'" .... 'hl. 
" : - ~ '.' :.' ' 
cone.,.~" · ... lel ""l'~'" :_11tl .......... ~ bu 
" " '. . .' ,:', ; . , .' . " . .' ~ :. , ,tc,' COlle.,...';" i.he,." ..... , ,....... ~ ill, ... · .... 
t .; c,' ".~". .: ./ .~ ~:: '~"'..' .~:: .' 1 ; . 5"';f . " ~ 
world.' _ ......... .-llb _1011 ......... "''''la1 ..,. 
'. to,', : ", " .: ,,:: '/, :",' ,", '--..,".' ;;' , '" '. 
the ...... ..a'·'U ....... "' . , b .......... ~~~J 
.\. i,' . .• ,.' • . .' '.i ,. , .'" . '.' j ,., 
_ lb. ' ..... ' .... f~ ............ ha .. the povet:t1 that 1. 
eha .............. 1lIM,· ..... .....,.._ft"~i ~', ··tAie ,,.,11f, .. 1 
..u.,' ..... ..., ..... .,.,...' .......... ,,·,.-.toe .... ·.'i. ' 
........ !,,.. ..... :...,., ......... ' •• aw .. tdlud ... luertM 
. ....... law ••• ,. ~.,. a: ... tf.e:y :.f; lltI"".',bf 1M 
.e •• 1 ill."C'" .,; ...... IIf.~ ... ·i .......... l·~ ........ .... 
. eta ..... 'U ... : ............. ;·.,~ .. , ... t .... '1I\e.: ..... .... 
·fIf .... t;: ......... ~~ ......... • ... lIiItatd·die ~.:.14 
" 0aIt,-·..,,,,,.< • .,. * 'tot:todal '.-_'" blt;:'litMlb' • 
.. ........ : ........ ;~ ........... in W7" ill wht.eh de Gaull-
baa .1~ ~~. ~·."'''~~:tlA:~'~~~~~~\'''''. 
t. vhft tW....,. .. 't ...... ~', .. t.tal_ 'c,,' hr"lt ,'.~ .... 
" .;},:,~i: . .'.'" '~., +;', . _. '" ," ':"'., ~};~ , , ,', ::' ;, ,. :,:/ ' ': .' ; 1-..;: . ",,' "~: 
'0 ao .... ~lt~hlet ~~l.,!-*,.:tl~ ..... ;,'t.b\. 
~ •• , .. '~ t..,"~It<'\',,~:' ;.,~.' e., "." ,,-, ~" .... ; ""~-~." :.' •• ",", "', ' . 
• 1.,-1. ~' ............. ' • .at~~ ..,l •• ;~M.... '. 
i ••. ' .. ·,e, .. ".. . . .:,.:. C;l. ..,., <.,' .' . . .... ' 
tU .. ~~,' •• l~ ¥aw..., ... " " ....... "'.3' 
> : : •• ~ '. i." , ' . ..: ,. ,;.~ :," :, . ~ ...' , 
!mPa~~=-uL~~lrr~~H ..... ~. ~. ~ Iaf .... 
14~.. S. FuntA.. J... "The Oftftd 0 .. lit:! ot Chal'lu 
:: ~l!'.t, r~ __ ".~_,I __ •.. V.~. ~. (~,nna. 1164), 
,. ~, "'~ 
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p~>~!:!!~: N~':!::~~:.e:.r.-: ::.;~: hal 
.atiall •• me all the lIOn beeauae ht. •• e.a ar •• 0 
...... 1., .. ,; ..... >hu, .. ".~ .... 0,..,81'1\11." Ss.,:,. l?~O. h. haa never c.a.ed to be 'naviet eonfliOntltal two ' .... 
:!':=:;~t~::= '~b:!:-{O ~::''''ftltf-:t·· 
·· ... i'th •.• , .......... '.C." •• , aJ..ucl •••• ,1Mat . ". ... .. in" ... ll' .... ' au_lailOft' to What 'e s..pO'~ •• ,. aft_ .. ' 
,::~~5T~~~~~=t~ ~;r~=. 
,'Z' ...... _ .,.,,~ ,co.~: t-ea"p"pea""l'ol., ~ ,,,.14 .. _tf4in. 
4e .. ,,..,..1._...-.s., -.,: ~, ".~ ;~ .• ~ .tlca'-t.,!~ Iacb_'~ 
"', . .-.J..:_ \I£'.'''~J.a>:~~~, \Jl~."~~j>'wht.c,~ .... ~. ~~..,.e4 
......... ,.\part~91Mu.a.,. If •. ,~ ..• ~t •. ;~.~ ;~;b .•• C.~ ,iC aut 
be unlted, 'o .. U~~ 19as..'d,".~~.,c .. " .. lJ b.,,~h',,"d 
thl'ouah •.•••. ~~',.~>~--17~.·&:;'~4tt7~'s.nM~t~ '·~~"~_,Oft 
ancl ae~;';,it.,:~\)itf~·J1',:\'.Tw" ••. ta., wt\tch ~4 .. :t.ul1 ••• t-
'~':'{ ' .. ,. ,to;,,':.. '>"~;~";"~4 ::, :. ' ... ; .... ~ . ~'.~; .... ', :" "_~ .. :.':,.~:~L .. ~~7, ~ ~. '."~ ::~:~.~:.~.,".,<, 1\ .,' ',. :~'j', 
don fo~,. ""' ..... l~l .. d~iJ~~,t~J,~,,~~t~ .h.',...l ... :· .... 
d"lnat''':.aie'',i~.'''','_''''''f· .. ~";."'.:; ;'1 :<: .. ;"" > 
F F 
" ,;~.: .. ",ii.'li tiij!.A·k:,.,.,~, ~ '''li .'~'.1· IUct4Jia . ""ctoIttaate 
> ta....; CM' ·'.faw ";:.rr(ll'~li "lb." : . It· ;;:4ff'th. 
;:. t. t"tnCjlt~t'"f''' ih .. lt,;"'ttli~ .. ·th.1Y 
=-.J. Fe.l~' _. h~f.'.",. :.~D~.;;o. he V:~=. :'f.· '. 3:. ,,.. ': .• '1 .. r ""lr""~."~;,l"'l;'-"',:J~, _"1, 1n pl"'~ •. Uc! pt'OIBl ••• al'8 lION .lf~tt. .. 'th. a~t •• ~·· '1M ' 
.......... :.'".", ......... ,o .... &I;'.c •• 11 blt, "fon. 
_ captlv.c",* "ft" .1M.. RI-" .. t boW wh.·Jeo 
:::::,:!~!:~t~~q~jiEm:!:t .. ::er. 
"-,',¥CN','1:..,' ," ... ~, .":'¥"", ~',' "_".""":,,.,., .""_.,,."' ." .. ,.~.", ." ,,~ .... y 
.F ,t • I 1 PI I 
I' 
_ly .f ••••• houaaad mftl.r:· • ad '01_ ..... 
=:!IaWlll h. find hl ... l _Crulted wlth full 
De Gaull ... Ia ..... that • 1. . __ Id _1)' .'bow 'h'e ........ .,. 
whac h. aeeOllPlu..... by t:he cllff'ieult .. _ thai .... fa ....... . 
oven_ .... bJ'. hl. wt.l1l ....... n.a". h._If 'a .... f
> \' : '. ' 
crial..1a tht •• the 1 ............. u,. a _ ... Ile fQrCe 
.ad ,"lb. ttw· __ " ... ap_ ..... ef~ ........ 29 It 
; \ . , " , , . 
. . .' . 
i •• lpUio_ ...... Gautle ._,he ·Med fo. • 1 ... Ie be 
lawl ... 1ft .,.. .... la .. "enald.aa' ... difficult .t.cuatl .... 
,,~ .' . ,. , . ,",., 
,',' ., ,: 
l'hu lact 11 .. I_hi. Ia _kina .., eval .. tioa.' ct. Gaull.·. 
'; ;' '.," ..... " 4'· , '. 
-J_tl..... He ~rl." thl •. ba.l. ,,11.f al foll .... 
t' , :'~ , .. '" " 
_.., =,c:.t;.~~; ='=~6f'-rl!" ~. 
e.......... Th .... of ethaneler flad. 8ft "[lal 
..... de liS •• u. Aff .... lt"l·· · ...... ,tit.if _ly' 
=t.;:t:tct~::~: =:::: ... :. ::th:-,:.:~t'::lf 
the .Inua.. ta • _tIer betwaea lt .. ttl.. Ita 1. 
:r~!r;t!:-:.~e =-.. ,,!t~":l:*:~~=-: 
.,. •• _ ...... 1_ ......... ,'''- ... th M.III.lf ... 
1 ... '01' DO hlatt-~ tbaa the bars", pl_," 
til ...... ,."'.itt, co ... ',•• _ h.'" ...... l •• -·· 
St. ... Gaull.· ........ ,......,. age that • pelltt •• , 
~ • ., .. C ... k~' C • .llC1lAt1oM .. tlb8n1.a. h1a ..... , ....... 
be .aatl.-.i .... " 11U ............ .." the Ftfth Republ1e 
'. baa beeft .. ___ d'''''''lfonlp·Mliey. ttl. lft:'~ht. 
. \. . 
.aclUad •• ~ ca,,1'., D.I., Idd Af. ·,,IIt· 11rtIr4. ....... it 0eIUd _leba . C." y .. ,; fi£tftli8 -... • ~). p., 104. 2',..,., ,. '.s • 




...... ".nthe .......... 1 nallty la eoafliel. &h •• d.·Gatl11e 
bu , .... a ..-lela'. _____ MltMaalsreacne.,.ll 
Snat.l1 ... '...."'.f.lt.lq, lus.pl latoth. 0&1l11bt cad: 
" ... Galle lII1l'llta b ..... of . ..u0B8 ........... . 
and bl. .~ 11 to play hl. own S....-whicb h. 11k.. to 
....... Ie ........ .e.'. ,.. ...... all ..... \_-.1 ....... power.. On .•• f the General l , fa¥O.it. 4uo.atlons 1, 
.......... _ .. cI .... l.,.u..pof tile S .... a •• abe " 
cold ... of all cold mon.c .... • De Gaull_ •••• himaelf 
....... 1Ib ..... ,., .......... l ...... ·ce1. _ .... ' 
hanee, which ... , _ke ie. 1My .... otber col. 
'_, .. b ••• 'Bri ..... It ....... , ..... u.t. .. sea_, ad 
Chi.a ~ "JZ. , 
, ! f~,r"\!.t",'~:':·., ~<' ~,.,. ,,', " 'F 
Although emotloa, aft_IiOft, frleat.hlp. and sratltude .y be 
valuable '10 'lftdl~l'.' ~'th~"tl"'~~~'·("tb. colt1 ••• of all 
." . t"';:.~<"'" '1' "Y '"'. '11 '. i \ ".- "".' ~ ':'":; 'k, ;'.~ :. ,~. '~,.\{.. ;" ",.' ".. ':t,.'). ~1-' "'"; . 
cold .. t .. ·) they an -t.aal... What _tten ... pelltle. 
, _ ,'_.. ;!~. ' ~ :. '.' . . ;.... . 1" .• ': ~' 
1. power. la the .b.anee of real bella for p.wert d. 0 .. 11. 
". I·~' . . '~ 'j_' . "'. _' t 1 ,,"';\. f·', .. J' :- ,'. ~ 1 ~:::. '. ,""·.r --
deCerml... t. aee..,tlah hi. aoab' ' ..... h ,,".,lIe.·" 
';' ~,,) ", ~ -r ';" ~ . ~ 1<', 'I:, ~.' ' . . .: , '~" ': ,'. .;, "~. . -•. ~ .. ~ 
Vol_ IIX of de Gaulle'. "wlla hal been 4\11'e reveallaS. 
, .;~"/, ".,"' •• : ..... ,', !"'~l ,- ,,;~,., ,,< ~/:'~. '. .' .{,.~" •. " :, 
Aeecmliq Co th ... Vrit1nS., the 801a alii of lacunal polley 
~ ~., ,~~ ,,', " " 
U to MId: ... unlty ... order. thUa .11owt.na the ata'e fned_ 
.' '( . ',' 
.-.. " 
1ft the t.nt .... tlonal anna.' To de Gadl_, lonlp polley 1. 
th.' onl,.tl"U.Pollt1~i POlt.~,..34MOn· neently, de' caull~ -,.-
." > " t, " -l ';::1 :" ".<>.'" ,',~ .",. :',; : \ ,. ~) ,'; !, , " ',", j • 
n~Jdl' • laid .. ~. ~iX, ~.",. -. '.' ., , 'i .... 
!2J~';' '_t~11.,~De·~ul1.~ aftCl a.1M" ' All Anal'~la. It 
Da,lfa "' .... Vol.. 47(AItfU, l3.1t64) .• ' .• 14. .. .... ..,. 
. 'a ...... B&I*taC ...... U •• -........ LallllIut a. " . 
trirl=.n~v:t.~r(=tl:;it6~.I;!-u!ew." u. s, KIn M4 
34,.1'''' Ct. ... , ItQeaeral 0. Gaull • .ad the' Poreign 
Polley of ... ·Flfth~ &e\NIll"-""'SI .. ' U'Na. Vol. 39 (Ap~ll. 1963), p. 200. 
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...... tlt .... tlt' •• a~1 "ie ta oat)' t:he Statea tha., .. valU. 
lt1,lct.t.· bc1 eapabt_ of aelll __ -= .. 4t)5 
MaerWl.ha8 tJ08f..led • ..,. ,.ubat:attttalulC~" 
" 
Oftll' ......... et.cl'.m whlch _at b. eon.let.red 11'1 any politlcal 
analy.la~y, that: etie ,Fllth R:epublicbas ' .... th.ar. polblcal 
phliOllOp1\y not'poll_"l .... ttUttdM ~.d.l!h urdt7'~an be 
,01' .... ', ·,~ll.·, .. _lud"'''''' thl ...... un be cm1),' •. , 
Il'8Mllof!1phu."IhWOUPwht.hhanc.' _t 1JIl.a. a l'luleela .loh 
eonflloe •• r .... ' ..... d ... th.r than reaolved. 36 Whether this 
cri1:1018ltl.,wlld·., wMIhe. tl ta • 1It.Moutnaat.. 'of 
eont_~~ ::,....~ .. St.&oa ~ __ ·"~1". 'LIt_ ..,lel 
.. • ".' :. -.', ' .~. ",: • < 
IUIS •• t_C, .. h· ... mete ... ,. ~ .. _ ·c_ .a-.=_ alGnllin. 
! .' '; , :' 1',,"' ': ~ t"" " .. - . :~ '.'~~, . Ii:, ",,<i.''f,.:.~'' ~:~ •• ,,: ... "'~. ;:, • " 
De Gaul1_ ' ....... ',.. .... to _ ... ' .... 1111 ... ·ta .... polltl..eal 
" ~'. . . ,'. ," •. ,." . ", 'I. ".",' , \.' ': "\ ' , . 
and IO ... .,..tal la.tltution.. Rather, de Gaulle 1.., a product 
- ': ,~: 'I.;" ; \ ,; ''f. .~. ~ ~ "y, '.~ : ' ~ , 
o~ ,~~~, h~lt7' ,A.ec~~~:to th~~!lew. vb. the Gener~l vaa 
8l'OWlns-ut. t..atermitlonal :r~latlon. .e" b laW and fact carried 
. ;: ',' .,:~ ': .' .. " t '. ' .' , "'( ",.' .:, ':.',,, ,: ". .. 
Oft between per,oraal .over"lgn8. The yearl of Freach gr •• tft ••• 
• ,!;' "'::" :" ,'~i ;.~ '.' '.~~'. ' 
were tbNe wh_ the head-of •• tate virtually _bodied the state, 
• " t~ .• ';" .' ..... Y" '. ":_ "' 
thua It .. ttd ....... ',....ulu..cllgld.t1 ....... atl.nulty 
'. \ ; ., , . ,'. ~~ , ~ ; .,~ , ,. /' 
wIlleh ............... , •• l.i'.' I"e fifth ...... ltA.' , .. . 
a •• 8ftC~"I''''''l._.~",~b.~leu_lua;~.~:,;, "117' 
• ) . ",)" ~:. ,".., • '" • . .~ .,,". . ,~ 0', < .j< ~ , " .,. !.','¥ .'.: ~ ~ .. '!.<' 
,,3'SS,xcb,.P.naa ,CGDfenac.".l1-..... u .. , 19~~1 .. 4f". .... A 111 de 08\1'1-1f1lar AtldrU,I •• ,. 174. ..,... .... . .. l'Mt ."''II!<''IIIP~.. .... .... "'.'7 
'; '. \ . .; '. • i._ , • ~.'" '.~' ~-.", ';' ~'4 :" ,'~ . ~ . 
~~I'ldl't "De.Oaulle-, FOI'e1aftPol1e1." p. 187. 
,,'~t.a_. " .... ~,::ac! ......... ': p •. '67. .. . 




"a. wllling to prophMy tbatpo.c.aaul11.e Prac. tlev1d .. t be 
lnelb,edCO d .. lsc '''1I'0Il PUNU1nl. within the ........ of ~t • 
.. ans, the lad.,end ... of actl_ fawred.by the "blft11 .. • t 
the woJ.-ld."ac_ ... 31 . .," 
For FUI'IIla. ..~ ",1131 ,oau111'C pOlley.... .. • ...,.. ••• nt 
, , ~<" "' I~ .,' , ~ i .'. ,., c ': • , •• : ' • .. ' 
an; radle.lt,.: ft ..... rt1S'Ne. x.. faet. hi , ...... erlld.,.· 
. . . 
" 
continulC7 btl ..... the Foanh; aM, Plfth ".,..,11... The _,,01' 
differeate,. be'C~l"", diet Nt l1e t.n the obj.ctive. bu~ in 
the hope of .chle .... nt. 39 
The major diff.rence is th.t d. Caulle bel1eve. he 
e.n for the fir.t t1lle .lnce the .ar _bl1i •• beh1nd 
• policy of national greatn... the many In,redl.nta of 
French power her.tofor. antaloalatle.l1y .rr.yed 
a,alnat each other. The great que.tion now become. 
whether unlty and .acriflee co lona be bIpoMfI on eh. 
French peopl., ev.n by a .an endowed with the charl •• 
utle aura .f the twlce-over .arior of 'ranee. 40 
In the fac •• f ext ... i" critici •• whlch i. occ •• loaally 
l.veled at d. Oaul1e and hl. pollc1 ••• lt 1. worthwhl1e to 
al.o .... In. a crltlque of aau11i .. wh1ch hal bean for.u1.ced 
by .n .vowed a.inr •• uch a. that r-..dered by Maurl.ct 
Thi. wa. Gaulll •• •• contributlO8 to ..... It 
llalply corr •• pond. to the factI' .ach nation 1. 
powerful aftd ab •• lut.t with lt8 unique e~r.cterl.tlc •• 
pa8liona. virtu ••• _dn •••• aenius •••• different frOll 
~ other a. on. hu.an belna 18 fro. .noth.r •••• rranc. 
a. a nation i. brtmmtns wlt6 po •• ibll1tl.. which French 
advocat •• of "'ricaa h .... oay continue to d.n,. ov.rtly 
or covertly. And yet in the Cllplomatic r.al. de G.ulle 
J , 
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haa demonatrated the intact power France once asain 
po •••••••• and h. h .. don. 10 with per.ua.lv. fore. 
incr.ased tenfold by the fact that the maneuver was 
executed woty yean aft ... the ..... t •• t dl ••• ter I.n 
our history, and durlng the very year. that have aeen 
the llqulciatiOll ••• of our 8IDplre. That the French 
aatioa haa recovered It. Placel regained it. fr •• dOll of action. that lt toclay polar ••• the hope of the 
world outalde the bloc •• Under luch condltlons and 
d •• pite the unchalleng .. bl. po.itlon atomic "',ona 
have given Sovlet Russia and the thd.ted Stat ... -thb 
..an. that aa.lll.. la 1... a doctrin. than a .ucc ... ful 
experlment, a v.rificatlon, a confirmation by the facti 
of a certa~ way that ___ "hlld Charl.. de Gaulle had 
of thinklng about Franee • 








DB GAULLE'S THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 
., WbeCh ... ... 11 ........ , lM_et._l ,.lltle. CaD 
at. expl ...... tn ",-.'hu a.u_..c ....... 1 ....... tb ... 
eIluha, . ,.. • pMcIaet of .hl ........ 1 ftu.ln.,. u .... hlna 
.f .. aca.he1c .-.ttea •. ;'Th. fact'u Chat the _alf •••• tloD of 
the a.u111 •• · ... ., • • , ........ t ..... 1 n1att.oaa 40 ........ 1 the 
r ..... t •• fnat .... 11.tl .... ,. •• t.tla ...... 1... De "all-
._ te .... n hiecOlT ......... ,.f • cen ...... 11,. .hlflt.q 
...-lll .... _ .f,..,. AI c .. lllt.ou ..... I ..... ...... t._. 
cl1.tel... 1ft .... ;. "'l.~the _.., ., ..... "eoul. lie th. :.11" .f 
_new.Dd 1 ••• 11, of ••• _C "",dt the _.de", Me ... 
tb •. ,adftnav_ IJ'l .uch."YOl'ld •.• be"iPcl''''~. , •• tu. of ... 
natlon ft._ .. Ully bIp~l" eM .ee'.... .f aaotta .... 1 , 
i. . a"'.tedl)' ci. a.ul1. hal .ffl.... •• he dld 1D hl' Elghth 
h...c:,.f........ t"at hl..oracua we' aot With ravol .. ina and 
and t ... nal • ., 14 .. 1OS1.. (""leh h. ",..... •• noabilla ..... than 
• , a' 1 •• 
, r . h P I • J $ I f • d g I 
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.. lled .. blt~) but racher with tb. ud.e~~ted realttie. 
whleh .re h.-ft, nat10aal artd conaequatl, la,enatt.oraal.-a 
'lb. . vbeD de Gaulle 11 told th.t the eXfNlDlt.oallt tendenot •• of 
Ru.,la an • threat to V01l1d peace. he must allo be inclined to 
eonsldel' _bOh tendeact. ••• a1thGUIIl 1 ... obvtoue. which .1g"l 
belona to' the UIIltect Stat... . Th.,.ltualloll ,. • ,owe ... 'ruBBle 
'01' which the .... ponalbl11t"<WtU.t be dlrided.' '. Bach Mtl .... late. 
t.a the .,. ••• f d.O.ul1e, partlcipate. 1n international politics 
as though it weren 'l'en •• f·con~llee ••• aehc.JI'imaall,. .t.-
temptinl 10 ... 'el •• ie. ec ..... Ch .a,th. expa ••• f·~e ether •• 
Each poll.tlcal 1.~.t:ah~p;Il"" la ...... of natloaa1 ~W.r.ct.ons 
, ,~ .~ w" :." > • !. "~ , 
and 1t 1. _1, __ a. eqoftllbrt._> of power 18 •• tatillahed that 
interna' ..... l;·~ri 'oan .,. aocOIDpl1aW.4 
0. Oaa11 •. hae ... f .. _ to·_ ••• cnaadU ta lntftutlonal 
politic. lor a ,.I'It.calar·Weol.,ical ayae_,, r.thet"M'b ...... 
lerted tbat "h'.~.""ly ,acknowledges the world as it' 1s. f.' 
le11y po ...... out tba"bu Gaul1i •• IIOticm.' the • .. ld .... ' tt 
1." flo .. aot eeft'upOrld ...... rll,.t. the • .,. CM.,..,.td ."urs 
... t~.. Rath ... ,i'tIUI't be oOMtdered 1ft the c.-ext .. 
_ ... 'T 
' .. f. i" F • . ; i 
"'. ,;' 
2 .. Caul1., "CbbthPr ••• Coafq;aace, n J"l,. 29, 1943. 
i:$I'or 6ddl"s"t~ p. 237. . . 
3Eugen~ Weber. "An Anxious Pride: French Policy, 1959," 
GII"_ lIi.ega. V()l. 36 (M,,..19S9). p •. 27S. 
~C"Wl.t ItOe G&1Ille'. , .. lan Pollcy, Jf p,,. 17.5-176. 
'de Ga\J11.....tnth ~. OoltferenQe t It January 31, 1964, 
aa'o, Add"' •• I. p. 2$8. . 
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d. Cedlt.'. coneept of the nation-atate. Since the General 
regal'da tlleworld to be multtple .. &ftC! national, C~t VOltt. he'." 
,lat.nt for hi'll ~o "lard the,·WO'tld •• ,_":I.,-I.bI8" .... ., ···.h ••• 
, . ,")"", 
natlons which are .. t supupowh'a.6 
Perhaps tbe, ~~lt:l.t fo~l.p pOlley shew, fa., \IlOft lMlaht 
", . " ';' . 
tary on for.lan polley 1. aeeepttW.' 
(, 
A wo~"l. "eJrellb pelley ean .... , " •• ta'le. Itt 
fOl'ilUtael.tiOllel •• t,<tt~I'.~"'.17 telta.p 1a mlnd 
ehac baC-.rqtlonal .. eOftdltlod j tl'_"-tt 11f81 .... lub-
j~ •• o .... ntehaaj •. aM .t" •• , eo ·~tlda po'e, .. Che 
",.ll.,ltht .II~ .. II aft tltul1cm tha, ean 0,,1, lead 
::..:!·t.'r;.Ta;.7J:;ftet ~';:mh ,:or ":;!i~:; t like, 
."l ••• -.e •• 'b •• ''''lIt:·~''.'''.''.'''.'''~tr •• e •.. 
..... oft_. C~" ftOC ,; .~.~.It.,.. . "-lftt .. ,,~.,.f .' IIISKi 
lDI4.l. ; tamawtat ad 'caa t4lid to a ,.' •• hH' ... th. '. 
tfil'1 ..all itobe tlteM aftt.'l.elated 1 •• uea. Problems 
of lnt'r.natlq~ relatlo" an lnte~~ec:t.d .... 4, . .-arely 
eaftone tsn_ be e .. I. ..... 1ft ... eu.. tft olhe _rds t 
f .... t.an polu" ~. bee .. t.nt~ontlnent .. l pol1c1 and •• 
•• 1\ I. lftdl.1.1bt.~J~ " . . '. . 
It ls ~l •• t,. th18 .C'CIIIIII. notlen of 1", .... tl __ 1 "latlons 
to wht.eh de Caudl. ohjeetecI. Act!Oribl& to V~ft'. th_ first 
t •• k which de Oaulte 1ft' f~ ht ... lf "hen he resat""',,..r was 
to rid hi1leelf . el the 1.,_lOsln Whieh had -.rged 'f'er Wel'l. 
War Twtt adwhleh prejudleed the peal110ft ef PYaae. in .... ld 
.,fain.8 Tho •• ' let_logt. .. 'tt'hleh COftf'h'mtetl ,. Gaulte...,. 
U I . d 
~Kel1)'."F ..... h a ....... t.oa .f HUtoq,,!' p., 641. 
';otdOftt ~ld.ttI -. tJalg blI.C!. p. 13. 
SJ.eg~ •• vernantL"rcmdernent. et Objectlf. de ~a Pol1tlque 
Exterieur. n.ea's •• - mlUIauIUM.C' (1963). p •• 59. 
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tI., ..... a. 1.11ft1.", 
1) La 1IOIlti ... , clivi .... deux paw ... 1u"., flUi 
marqueralt cette seconde moitle du XX. sieele. entre 1& 
tlocl,lo.'. llbe"11 ••• ",olt.'iq ... et ,'O.lle d" .... l' •• I' .. me 
cOmmuniste. t'OeeldentCfolt. en consequence.' regrouper 
•••.• 0 .. 0 ••• , ... 1811.s •• '_ral •• , ."n·cl ••• ppo •• r .u 
as.auta dfuft adversaire qui agit tanCot par 1& ruse, 
,ui ..... , .. plan " .. , •• lb.ft .de loaaue·halelM. 'u. , .... 
sequence practique de cetta coneeptlon manlcheenne eat 
.- ,.,. ""' ..... e 1, .. 'I.cta.'ee 4utaOl'l'elib.. .. fa .. del'.dversalre ne peat que lavarller sea entreprlaes. 
'. '.: .a) c..c. ~lvt.lo,,'" .,... •• 10a de • ..,. ,1n.. 
loglquu antagonist •• s'aceompagne dtune repartition bi-
polaire de 1a puissance politlque. militaire at 
econamlque •••• 
3) CeI'.11.~cSu ,el .. prbaclpel' .nonces ci-dessus 
••• on c .. i ... i..o ... "" ....... t i ..... .a.la. . 
a) ';" 18. puissances coloniales europeennes que 
1a l1.quWat . • •. 1AUu .,..lCle .. Ou-...M ... ;mettalt _ 
, ..... ··1' ill 1 .... ' •• lA "'l'Opole dana lea terrltolres 
qut d.P4IOd ..... ' d'.U .... '" .", . " . 
. . b).,.r 1 ..... oo.ld .... ·l d~ .·..,.., •••• 1 .... 
s.. 11<ltAd",* ,4.,S;tWlu..,, __ .. __ lea in. 4_ 1. . 
'tt! ... 'Mo •.. t..P1~!,_",,~P& ... s.. aee .... ~e. 
1 a~"ts..:. 1 .. f1 ........ ev1rt .... , ... ..,pea 
44u. 1 ,"pI..~'i.o., ., ...... 1.... ." , 
S1nce the war the £1111,'1.11 ot international politics 
have chanaad; or at least the 'r •• Uent ot France belleves that 
they have ·'chlna.d. 'A. a re.ult. de Gaull. hal cOme to re~ard 
. . . 
the pr •• 8l'lt balance 01 ~.r'as unn~turalJ precarious. and 
unwise. to nel1evtng that the world is on the threshold of re~ 
.hull1ement regardlni intemational a1ilanee~, deG.~lle's task 
11 at once apparent to htm. He must understand theae, forces and 
guido thetr operation. To do this it 1. necessary to loeus 
aeeentlon on fheperenn1al'·utlc.mal corittt.ct'that he believes 
b • $ •• It. Db • 1 J J I.A • I • 
9V~4nt. "Poftdementl at Object1t. de 1a Pol1t1que 
EXt.rl~ ...... 1 ••• ~pp,.4Sge60. 
10Maeridls. nDe Caulle's 'oreign Policy,ft p. 176. 
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..... ld. ideolOS1 ... 11 
The ballef .ut eM p"",,' lMlanc.·.la ~l eo be 
t:boM:lo 4 •. Qau11.'.oon._~i_ clutc the ,nwba b.\polanzatlcm 
of the world 1. 1nooaalsteDl wl'h tbe aecula~ realitiaa of lnt~ 
national .. e.l1" .. ,.. ,12 V-"" .. au- tba, thla .. eY'-ion ... aded 
111 int ...... i._l 1".t.tHu ... '* ..... .., a1moa~ lrea ella e.nllast 
. . 
year8 .1_ .. Wol'lclWu II. Tbe "".", •. ,wbi4b h. pe"alvad., ..... 
five: 
" .... , , ~ - " -. , .' .~.I, " .', . 
a) ~rce que lea regtmG.evoluentl 
. . .. .,) . 1.ua_.~. ft&t...M l!qllq .. q .. le t.,. peut 
laire 80n oeuvre; 
;. CIt}" ftX'oe flue 4 ~vae ~~. 1 .... &1_ •. la pollUqu. 
n'eat paa aftaire d'ldtologl., 
, . ·:·cl) ...... ~le ..act .... par nature divers beau-
coup plus que dualltt.t 1 •• ftler,l 7 .ont de plus nom-
breux at ,Janr caP"". de .. ,t._ ...... 1' .......... la 
,.w. .~li ..... ~.... ,.  .,. d4n. ~,.. •• t . 
. e) .. ".... .'11 n' .... ,.. 8 ......... 0.1-
-.I.'II""""u .1,.1.rl ..... aolt. ~ g .... te.. ta 
pda. '. .". ; 
r.~. 184GbJ.no_ ',hat, ~'houlb ~t..1 .. tiler ... s 
remain ~~ ,he,- ,..., h1eo.; :".1'. _~I" :exJ. ... "lle 
': ~ 
.. ;' 
strict c~ ... ef t....c yeArs. Within his conception of the 
eoamsnu' ....... c.uv. •• Mg,,$.11e qp1a1fted, aa ... ,,.,1_ .-d 
..... e ... 'iOn ba ...... pl....,..th.·mutual r.1a.,.....· .. ween. 
ChI. ... 1M ,ad ~.. freewo .. J.4 hav.......... .. 4Revlr",,1 ..... 
covary; and the aecession to full sovereignty of dozens of 
•. ' ," ~ ,., • ,'" - j', ., • .- I, ' .," • , _" ." .,' 
t' •• F $ n .,$ t 't F 
.1 ••• , •••• $ 
, l~Mi:el'lcfll. "Dcf ajutte'g P'oretgn Polley," p. 118. 
12D.w •• ,. 176._ 
lly.rmant. "PelI.Cl, •• ixl.rlau ... hancal ••• u PP. 460-61. 
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' ........ 1,. eol6nind countr1 .. baa, toda".bul1t aDev WH'ld 
equll1briue .... ured1,. .ore, .e.ble tbaD Ih._ of the 'COl. w .... 14 
In a .t.cement at MOfttbel1ard in 1962 •• 8 Gaull. a.ld. 
Cea peuple. at c.a Etats de l'lurope dolvene. 
enaamble, oraaniser 1. cooperatlon at la pratlquer, en 
... d •• rti....- • WI en,"-' ... ta •• " .tt ... ,..t. t .... er-
nel, qui ne peut pas ne pas produlre aea affecs sur 1.a 
,..ple. d. ll_twe eo.e d1l rid ••• de l.... C •• ,..,l •• -la 
lont laaenaaraent deslreux de trouver 1e moyen 1m Jour 
" .I,tr.a ....... f ... ttma!!l_C ..... d •• h_. fI"'11s 
aont eC que neus aommea. 
, 
Thla coneepclon of the btamatlonal sltuation wherein the fonter 
foe. are regarded. as posalb~e future a111es haa been a major 
tenet of Gaulllat foreign policy from it. inception. As early as 
~' f 
1959, de Gaulle vaa preaching thia view. 
'. " 
Doubtl •• a Sovlet Ruaas.a although having helped 
ae..aal_ ...... ..t.blbhW I.Ja ChUla, r_1t_ ,tha' ' 
ftOthlng can prevent lt, Ruella, a white Eul'Opean natlon 
wlHh baleolMla ... ed 'pan. ofA' ...... la· .... c. i.· .. 't. 
well endowed wtth land, m1ne8. faccories, and wealth·-
.. thLnI oan'ita.pell te pl"fte8t ie ,..- haY11l8to nek01l 
with tfie yellow multltude Which 18 China--numberle.8 and 
... tebecl17 poor. l.t1d .. tNCtlble and _tti.tou_. bdl .... 
by dtnt of violence a power whlch cannot be kept wlthln 
lielea ... l_klDgawnmcl at ;-the _ ...... over _t.ch i. ' 
mulC one day spread. 16 ---
Perhaps more sisnlflcant 18 the French reallzatloll (even 
. ,". " 
if premature) that the Soviets are no longer antieipating a 
t .. 
take-over 1ft EUI'ope. In fact. recent year. do not reveal any 
• " (I l r • L •• n 
1~ut"1a. douve de Murv111e. 'ftFrenehPoliCY Today, tf 
AtIU'" c ... a.c;r9Mrs.&:lx.Vol. 2 (W1Dt,l'. 19644!1'6Sl. 11.616. 
1 '..,..17. 1962;' louacl I.lt ,",gerM_tp, DI SiII'~1 .11 
,-_ (Pa'la, ,F~~. "1963). p. 186. ' 
16de Gau11., "Seeoad ha •• Coafe....a •• u N..,... 10, 1959. 
HI~u Addl ...... p. S8. 
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signiflcant Soviet threat. or otfenaive 1nit1atlves. The 
'rench. therefore, whether coneet or flOC I.n cheir judgment. 
de,=ermlned that the time was ripe tor new approaches to foreign 
poltey.I' 
Another lundamental of Gaulll.t loreip pollcy 1. tlte 
evaluation of the pre.ent world .ltuatloft a.' being .dr_ly 
precarious. 'Tf1eeontlnuousbrlnkconltionttDg Mth lar •• and 
.mal1 nations 18'. dinger' which ~at be cSt.pacen_. la The fear 
revealed in chiacone.pt01 the unexpetted la.t.o a patrent.1 
charactwtaticof the General', pollticAI thought. In hl. 
memolI's the aener.ilreealled bt. deterftllnatlon of April, 1942, 
when he declared that 'lshttag pt~e. would .tand by her al1t •• 
on the cOndition that they ltarad by her. ttl. cOileen. •• the 
reeognlttOn of . the Vichy lover_aile by thoae uelotll auJ)1tOIWly 
. ' " ';_ .. '. ". ,'f. ',', 
dedicated to democrattc prlnelpl... A. eart, .1 ehb etate . 
de Gaulle, reallzlngthat' "raneeh*fbeeft betrayed 6yber ruting 
ela.s, looked rONaN to the revolut1on Whteh he hoped to accom-
p1ish. lYe reallzed, hCn,~r. that tM supftrpOWen could not be 
trus ted to guaratee the peace.' He' COile lu4f1d bt, ..... rk. by 
warning that the .ltuaeta would belntolerabl. "t.f !be .•• It-
.' '. ,". ! . > 
styled realism that, from ~. Municl. to another, fl •• led liberty 
to the very edge ot the abyss vere'to eemtlnue to impole upOn 
Ii • 
17MaUl"lce COUftde Mttnllle, "'lb. Role of Frane.," 
6IlID'&I ilamJ.I' g,lIr,g&1 (St.IIIIIMll', 1964), p. 2S8. 





ardour and to betray saerlflce •••• "19 
In de Gaulle's attempt to realistically .. aluate ,he 
world-sltuation, he has continually believed in the need ¥hloh 
great powersba.,. to perform some wo1:1d tlle,l01h SpacJ,o\sl 
utopias are fundamental to thelr ideololl.s. Th~ y .... of ex-
perienee have t.usht de Gaulle to be somewhat d~atftltful of the 
residual cbauvJ.nil1ll which masquerades tatder I1beral ld8010,l ••• 
This chauvinls. 1e ayraptOMtlc of an lnterutlon.' hi"1ult,._ 
., . .~. 
Thie haa become a predominant tear of h'tnCh pol1cy-mat<eI'8 1a 
.. eat , .. re and bas reau1ted t.a de Gaulle's deten.J.Mtloa 10 
end the dual .. atery of the .uperpowera.20 
The most 1Male factor which haa cOIlpelle4 de Ga-.11, t. 
, " ,', ~. 
reject I'M ~lOft .1 bipOlarity ,tl,.tel ~Olt1;rt.~t •• .co laCfte 
,~' , .' ' .,' '. .. .." ~ .' . 
natlcmalhMtorit 'It eo\ttd .11110._ ..... s.td "that NC~ '.·blpolJl.. 
~ .' , ' .. . 
framewo1'li itt no1t"lftt .,re .". 8ft lnaCltutl.oul1Qt1f'l\ .,. Cold 
.. I' ,"" . 1, " 
War ten.l._. . '11 att_etftlf t'Oftea.saeevt.tft 'all:_1elpacs 
ln the WOI'ld pQlltlca1 areu. de Gavlte hopei ~o resCOJ,"8.tM 
no~t eonditlqns of .tradltl~l dlplomacy.!1 
One ethel' ele.entWbleh. de OIftdle found dlat.a.tetulltl .the 
pnt8ftt Nlaee .. the laek of .'Wi ... wblchltdlaplqad. 17 
allowl.nl two ft8ftOftl~h. United Stac .. and the Sovl:at UIll.on ... · 
each of wb10b .o.u11 ..... leI ....... INa j\lll ........... of the 
db J • btl J , 
l'de oaulle t ~'D, pp. 25(1).'1. 
20Kelly. MPreneh Restoratlon of HI..tory," pp. 644-45. 
2rVernaftt • ·polttlque Qcterleure P'rancals.," pp.' 461';'62. 
• r 
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world ee.aunity. ",.aI"01.a Ufll'a ..... bad he.-lI7t Cbs J.a •• ~. 
dene. ami 11. .... ly, •• WOI'14 ,.l"lea ...... " .. ,..ralz ... !2 the 
French "s.aHbolh .f Ih ...... ii'"eal It. ...... ~expel'l .. ed 
and lmpa."._ ..... uaon. 'a .. 1 .• f •• g • ..u.'.: grad ••• 1p 
> ' 
In_l .... , ah. ,... ... 1 coaaoll.d4*I.Oft of Etaope, .. tual1, 'canee's 
, '. 
plue in chi. Iaopewould b. eenual.11le leu, tbe ... f~be 
Gaulll ...... oen.-. , ....... *hqe lW ,..,.... ,,111 deli.a1t~v.ly 
agree to. 1*"_. clivi.1Im.f I~,..~·J).· 0-.11_ .... the other 
hand, hopes to organb~e aDd lead a more traditionaldlplomatie 
cour.e a~ thu. NUnita Europe.!3 tht. f.ar: w~.'expYe'.ed l1t 
, , 
hi. eighth preas confereneel 
, ••• the United ScateaWh't.c. 'h •• inc .•. Yalta and potad_. l1li'. 'hal 
..... _. af •• 411, co Nk ~,the Sovt..et •• tAe,U .... ted 
State. aee. tempting prospeets openbl& up before !.t'. 
H .... l_ ' .. acanc .. ·· .• ll tbe·....,.r.ce ... ot1atloaa. between 
the =lo-saxoftl and .the sO.neca whteh. 8t1l.rt. lfts.·, wlth, the lltd:_,e .. t .n ,..1 ... ,t;._ •. a .. lite1p to be 
extended to other que.tiona, bOtable E\JrOpeall •• a. until 
_. ,eM ..... ' of .. ~•• _"eh 01"1'17 .,a • 
••• 1l'IIt the vi ... of F'rauea. 
',', • l ., ,.. \ ~ 
At an even .arlt.er date, de Gau118 wa even morepe8.1m18tlc, 
. ,,", ' Prob~blY 'the.ort ol8qul11b~lUID that'l.' .. ta~ 
lb~·llH1t .... __ ·Ohe ...... 0 .,..,..of eM ··CWO. '-1'. t.., for the moment t • factor 1n world peace, but who ean 
.., .n _II :\haPJ*l .. ____ ~ Wb.o .... ",., ... ~1 •• 
whether .ome sudden advance In davelopment.-partteular1y 
1 ..... f'elel o •• pue· ........ ~t.11l1OCpro.w. OM with 
... 
22MMridll. HDe Gaul 1. 'a renelp '-110)' .ft" Jh 1~6 .. 
, '.'. 23,Ed,~,rS. Fu1!'nl •• ,,,.~r. t,~tTh. c;rand ne.1p of Chari •• de ;:~11'3=.,f.a£D'. ,Owtrt1r..x ~~.. Vot. 40, (Sprln:~. 1984). " " 
,', ,;14". cali11., ·I~th Pr ••• CoJ1fw8ftee. It July 29. 1963. 




.uch an actftt\ •• S.ehat ttl r-tcefttl lftellttaelOft. will not 
hold out? Who can say whether I 1n the futu't'e J 1f ba.ie 
political I.e ... bout" ehangltcompletely, iI' naa alnady 
oecured on the earth. the two powu. that would h4" a 
IIOMPloy onmael-eat:' Vctapon8 ftti~t not _ke .d_1 wleb 
each other to divlde the world betw .. them? Who ca •• ay 
... h ... , .hCM.ild ehe Gee •• lon dd. ...... td.l. each .ide might 
follow a pollcy of nothurl1ng it. device. at the prtn-
01,.1 eclvefta..,., '0 •• 1tOt: to be tbfta.ttlned by l' • ...who 
ean .ay whether the ~ rivals might not crush others? 
an. oan ~ well imagine, for example, that on 
such a terrible occaslon, Western europe mlght be 
de.ft014k1 fliCml ~8ftd 'C-.cnlluropefl"Otft "' •• hblgton. 
And who can ,lay whether the two r,ival'l a. a re.u1t of 
..... tIn' ....... bl. polltte.! and:!r:t.a upheaval. wl11 
not come to the p'olnt of unlti118? .., 
After aa.e •• ing t!,e present power bala'QC .• and flnding it to ,be 
. . . 
inadequate, de Gaulle has concluded that Franee could once aaain 
become a major in~luence tn world affairs. The. cause or ~k1nd 
was a •• umecI by Prance and. acting under the gutse of thl.$ ideo1-
" ' ':~ ,,-" , , .: , ' 
ogy, de Gaulle hoped to pursue. the, ,!!ause of peace. pr08~ •• 'f and 
and worl"acMl~.....e." 1ft ,~er~,. eOtltrlbUt'e :f!O" the ..... ~ ...... lng 
of oppeal',lOft ·and. contft.t'or the b1l'Olar wor~~f he' ~dft1:00k a 
policy e*ll1ng tor the multlptleatton of diplomati.e Te,t.tiona. 
..... ,r , .~<" , ,,~i ' " "~ 
thus lt WO\Ild lt~ "',1..,1.) ateordl.fls '. de a.ulle' "tflat in this 
way the aoule of __ • ..,.,. ... r they .. " be' ~n hls earth, wll1 
·f· ..' .. " '\ .... 
meet a 11~tl •• "'~ at the' ~.~s;tftat, Pranee,aw; the' 
.' " ~ , " . 
. -; . 
tmivane .... 'htMCtred ,aM .~".tlw ,..ars aPt t~e'~.tVtn.ts 
of liberty. ..1 tt,. .*_ fraternity • .26 . 
In hle •• l_t ..... of the Cold. War eltuatten. tune •• 
WIF • 
2'4eGaulle, "Second Pre •• CODference, I. Novemb~r 10, 19.59, 
tiljgl: 6fWaa •••• · p. 61. . . . 
2.4e (:.,,11., "Nlat), hess Conference," January 31, 1964, 
MaSDE 6ddElI., •• p. 2S8. 
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noted. that Europe ha. aot only _de. nemenf!ou' ... lIOtaU 
recovery t but al.o i. today. less harried by ominou. soundinas 
from the East. A significant factor 1n thi~ lessening of tension 
is the conclusion of the treaty limiting nuclear testing. Com. 
• • y .' 
plimenting this. the Russian military offenslve has become le.s 
credlble to Western Europe.27 
'ftl8H ••• be 1l.ttl • ..,.te..,., ' ...... for ••• hroudSnI the 
, ," " ~ , 
policy ............. f .d. caalle, whl.ch c&a1lo. i be ,end!'a'" t.'tbey 
'. ,'- ", 
are eon.i •• Min ·the light of _bt.. pel111c.l ,Id.lo •• "". The 
;". ( ~,; \'.:,~' < "" l' >, ' " 
General.s Hpeatedly a .. te4th.1 .-. Nll. .... 'IUt ·1fOJlldtlOlt.tics 
; i .~ 0."., ~ .... 
were d •• tbed. for new direction. and that international align-
" 
ments n ..... 'o M,~"~,,,Ce4. oae bclka .. r 'of thl.. ... to 
"," J ' "'; 
be found b eu 'in'eraalftM1'der .f tbe ,.talt.t ... ,.a 'bl •• 
~, '. " .;.~~' ",:, "' " 1 , • ' 
< .. fa" •• ttae:cotaltea1. .. power. ue 00_"'.'. 
I. ...... ohiou CO ... · ... t,·' .. h ''"ta01l1a1!'~'fI'01''II'''' 
.If ...... t. llltan'" to a1afta a.. tIN. 'te au.tn ... 
the 'Weat.ht faG .. "'.l •••• : we ... '.ppnetAtetn. ,tn-
.... l'difft.cat.l •• , ...... teHd .", th ... leacl ••• 'b all 
lhe'dfOrt.t!Ml.1.~ • .aktas. ettherto'1IIpOee .. Ih., 
peopl .. ". aya •• """h 'S ·eotIWal7 ........... tll"t~-
., .. tee .... leeft\Mdon •. Ita ehat .".t. wh1eh are, little 
by little{. being demanded by the rise. of n.ew •. 1. ite. and 
,,·,the _ .. eat 'presa_" ., the ._, •• ' ." ."',.' . 
. ~or are."e unaware that in their campa th •• truggle 
~. =:t:'l~r!)~t~=i p:~~~~:t~'::'i~!-rm;l:~ble 
011.e ............ '.' .. q_t ..... eMIl 'whe •• · ... -.1.0"""",_ 
--cannot help but unsettle them. Moreover."e know that 
.' ,in C1utN ........ t.uCMre ... ocmftl.dt. ..... 10 .. 1 .t1. ... 
&ftc.. 1ft spite of the absolutism of their ideology. We 
aallae. tberefor."QIllycoo. well that. .. the,. xeadUi lDdu1ga 
1a virulent utteranees and sensatlonal outbursts 1n order 
---------------------------------------------------------------------~ 
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to le3d people astray·-wlthln their own country and tit-
.ld ••• wlth"" t however t ... enteppllll _.tata bouaf1 •• 
1ft ......... 8ftC t •• , .. a. la the .a. yet., Couw de·Mu:"i.lle 
_,,",'" 1ft .... ... poettl_ tet:Ma tb., ¥letICNl. the ' ... neh 
hadtakelt t!egardlftl what ha. fYequtltl1 "'n called • Uth ... ' 1n 
the blteh&tlolaal , .. leu •. 
'. . In the £a.t., ~ is .... 1.tlaled bf' ebe c ... 
frontatlon between China and RUI.t.aJ chi. 18 a real 
...,tun ... nault flra' of " .• ppOIJtclOD fJf .-.... 1 
lnterest. Which goea a. far a. the traditional frontier 
CMmflloU_ .ae oe.ntrl.. ef £H,em,. Btd!'ope baYtltake 
advantage of thls by apeediftg up an already noticeable M_ .. , ....... --.1s-tt.oa ·.aclJ by ,~ iA a ... 
way that the dlaparaging label of .8,ellita is becoming • 
.. wl;th ttdI .. .,ti.eJI: oflaat OeaMrtY. 1.- and 1... jaa. 
tifled. 
, , :, ' 1ft t:hiI W ••• , to ... e" deall"a~,. th_ .re 1lO' ~ 
fllcta. Mptttl'~t:yfil. the underlrlng lntere.ts 
remain mutua. • a lanc. i. a rea lty and a nee.s.ity 
recognized by everyone. But this solidarity on the 
lUftd ... ntale do. not l)r8Wtlt), the auto.atkalla-.t· 
of the paat from having bec~ an anachronism. and little 
by little aftd to dt!ferant d_sreea, 1t does JIOCJ)hVent 
aome members from rediscovering their personality and 
. chair ,fre .... o! aclion. The. 11IIC'UJralnaultt. of the 
eeonomic re-establishment, the consequenee of a solution 
ta, which ehe thr.a.~"wt1:hout'be1hg -..ah 1e •• ftal, haa 
become more diffuse I, is an awal<eniDi: at least to the 
, .1M8d Co find thella.we. onoe,aga1n.~' , ' ;. 
, The P\-anc:h .... not: ,;tbeonlyOD" . to haft p8J:C:(ti'Vfld '. 
01\*'88 lb abe' i.naem.tloaal arena." "81eZ •• inakt. .haa · ••• ,eeI hl. 
cO'lWi".lon that cheSon. t7ntcmha. 1ft .eeent ,.an h.,0118 sus-
ce"tlbl.cocbe aetraetf.l:tn; of E..,.. Heconald ... d the former 
t' Ii It IT 
~8 .. Cau11., --rbb'd .Prese ConI .......... S.pt .... S', 1960, 
HI';' Add"", •• pp. 84.85. 
%~uric. Couve'de HUnille, "The ~ole ot 'ranee," ' 





attitude of the ~usslanl-.on the one hand, arrogantly ta1kln$ 
of Mosca. as a "third Rome;" on the other hand. revea11ng a 
sellse of deep-rooted lnferlorlty to the West. The task has 
remalned for the communlsts of the Soviet Unlon to.combine 
e • ' • _ '.' ~ • • , ' 
thls s.nseqf ld..,10gica1 universality and,superlority w1th a 
:' ',~ . ' 
drive.to erase the lnferiorlty. Tbe ... ns chosen to accomplish 
. ) ",", < . " t'. " " 
thi.task was to create a xo:el«tionshlp wlth the Wele that was 
. ,." ..' . , . " .,' , 
equal andhonorabl" chrouah a na~owlnl of the tecMo1oatca1, 
econom~c and c\Jltural gap. Th. problems with Chlna have, at 
"'. . '; 
the salM tl.8, d,e'Jtroyed an)" pretense of un1versallty. Soviet 
eont1:01 of S.ltet;n.Europe alIa played a vital role al a trans-
( .\', . '. . . 
• 18'lQD.~elt for idea. 8Qdvalu ... between the ,reat politieal 
30 pqwers •.. , 
Accord1na to S~lzb.r8.r. d. Glu11a besan Co reappraise 
.' " J _. • I" 
the Sovie,t .1.tuat19O aa ear~y aa ~9~6, tw~ ye.r,. before he 
c .... to.~er •.. ' !Ie noted ~hat. the Weat had 8cceptecl ,~h •.... 
,1t.&;101) In.Europe althouah there.,.ti11 exl.tedv1018Dt 
. ...,'J .., 
re.iatQCe lnPthe'r paJ:'ts ()f the WOl'ld (such .s the Middle 
East). At this .ame time, the p~olr •• "otd •• Stal1nl&atlon 
th.t ht,.. ~ •• n .launch.4Ju.rted • ,olltJeat ~ha.. Wben the 
" ,-' 
revolts ,.b~Qlt. out 10 Poland and lnR\Utaary, t;hes. po.1tt" 
pol1ticlt,lgas·could bot' ha"e b •• n1imc:leaf'to.the Soriet 
l.ader'~lp.Ceftabl' 'they must. have ftlal1led that Ia.tern 
Europe·could flot be conquered, that although Soviet influence 
30Zblgntew Brzezlft.kl. "'!tu.sla anti Europe." OElilA 
A~fal~8t \101."42 (~~~'ll, i964). p. 443. 
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eould be felt through military means. the people had not inter-
nalizedehe goala of the Soviet le.der8hi~ and had nGt aceepted 
the leglt ..... yof the ~t. '*itb thie riall~.·tiOftt the 
Generat Hsard .. the ~e.nnti.t • .-ent to hlt..,. loat ita 
dynami'.. The ,;ala ... tft £\trope had 'been tacitty aeeepted 
by both alde, .ha. a. the" tlftlted State. ~1d not nali.-
tieally hope to "YOll-baek" eeilMtntn, •• to',the Sovl •• a 
abando ..... ,. hope of oOMbg 10 ,otM .. ' 1ft GerM",. Itat, or 
'ranee.) ·the ._lasly.wgn. nail_118m within the bloe 
which at thit IlM :" ..... ll •• ttn' It •• ll .ub'tantta'" the 
C8ftft.t'.hl..toneal OOMeptlOft.'th.ft.tlo~st.te ad 
the .. f ..... , a.d"-sreat.~".t.shtte the' ••• 1 ••• 1ea which 
•• a_lieu' made. ' we Iftl, ... aNed the sori.. leader. •• 
,.ll.tto ..................... lft.ftbanelnr·~hetr own power 
.... ....uS eM ._ •• fnatl .... l .4tftne .... t. 31 . 
.. blat .• lwaelt{tNUItd .f thiltegle aM tj1d.a*" lfteo ' 
c_Wwad.ofttM CJe..-.1". view of 1Pr~. it 1s Mt' dtlft.eult 
to ..... can4 ............ ".It •• tbe lo11owlftg whieh de Oa\111 • 
• d. ~_, ..... 1It 1M ~lfth'R.bltet. ht.'OI7t 
4feft ,aft Of. tfte ...... leftat teri8tOft. if! ..... 
that on the Soviet aide of the world a few 1Ddleatloft8 
.f Yel~':~t-::a::!!:-,m:~er; :JP:::~ has been aald 
by." b pOalelou ofr •• poM1bl11t,wbo.. -vt..aa . ' 
called "a t,ruee on In,vective. are proelalmi~ the, ' 
d •• ~CO .... 'pMe.~bec! .. a't.*.otl~.l reality .. au. 
I •. · .. erlnglo the fact that 11'1 certain troubled 
...... th. Mlddle Ba8e. lnd\.a. Laos, Af'ric.. Central , 
At'DUtea. for ....,l .... fOaeW at '''11 tltme 1. "training 
F • < J"t I 1.« • 
31t:.L. sulabeqer, "I'Oft"!!' Aftaln I RGV de Gaulle Saes 
Russia," 11K xatk ILmtI (June 24, 1966), p. 32. 
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f~ pou~1D1 oll Oft the fir.; I .. r.f~ln8 to the lact, 
that, alter having appeared to call on the three great 
W •• tern powers &0. put •• end Co .h.'. pre.enoe 18 larlln. 
the Sovlet Government relaxed lta pressurel I am rea 
fen1.nl h the f.ol ahaton " lbe 'ocea,len of .h., ' ..... n. 
debate6 in the United Natlons, the Ruastan repre-
, .. ,&tl"., a .. co·.e ..... tn .. c_ tan till •• tete'_ 
the cone piracy of 111'w111 and demagogy that a group of 
Sta ...... _ ... le •• ,ttfted op •••• klftl Co cws.nt. .. , 
against France; flnally, I am referrlnS to the faet that, 
.......... "aad W .. t._ ooatao.s an belllR .... 
between leaders, scientists, artlscs, etc., whil_ 
awet.ctaa·· ehe,:tlM ft. lIhe ,..pl .. Ift_.lve.' MJ'-
perhaps someday exchange wlthout.hlndraneetheir goods. 
ell ..... Wea .... ela.l. tl" ... 'ara.-Z . . " ". 
De Caulle.a ...... ed 'the poaltlonof tlte S09t •• Uaion 
t.. Yin .• f tit. ,..t acI'th. fuce... Cl'aduall, .. Ihe lofts. 
1 ..... , ... 11 .... -to ....... 'hall' ..... blt",,,,,.',bt bell .... , 
•• "ina ba .... ·...... 1 .. wi.Ilehe w .. t. "'et., •• lb!11ty 
.f aay UDt~.t'.t -.bttt ... &ad at,o the pollet •• l, eeeaemic, 
&ad cultural .1 ..... 8 .11 d1o .... this ~ac, ... '3 An 1ft-
c .... lagaumber of st •••• in th ... rld toda, ••• parsoiaa an 
..... , ....... t f ... tp pellcy.' 1'hl ..... need to .h ..... sence 
of ~ .... t ..... lac. ehe eacI 'of the ear .ttO he". develotted 
• 11ft ,.lttl •• l phll •• ...".. .... of· .... lllnmeac' ..... ditlon, 
Ih ... rt.ous a.t.l1t ••• o"tbe ..,.."..nha .. " ... ,to_ ... 1z8 1Ome._H- of lM.,... .... ita that. pelte,..foI'mU1atlng proe •• l! 
. a ' ' 1 d· r tt 
'2.e GQlte, "S .. olld Pr ••• C01If.hIIC.," ........ 10. 1959. 
~'Qr Addrtt ••• , p. '7, 
3!staniey "'"Offma~1 "De (',aull., Euror.' and the Atlantlc 
Al11aDce." IPC""' .. Ir QralDiMC'gp. ,Yo. 18 (Wlntel'. 1964). 
p. IS 34 . , .. ' > • . .• 
eou.e de Murvl1le."French Polley Today," p. 616. 
t F 
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This dual coneentrat:lon of power which had been so 
acc~tq to the _jor poiII.r. bad fal1ec1' .fe_ the ... to 
provide .7 .... 1 .ecurlt:7 01' _ ..... to ... other .. d. ... of 
, ,. '. . 
By the. 1"0',,, however. this tight allunc. sy.tem vas coming 
to an en4t -n.. •. ~. WU' •. ' 1 __ .1.D&1 ... t only throuah Ch. 
natual -c..1oJaa 1Ihlch tt. bril1l" Ducal .. , a. a 1'''.1. • .,. 
inept JMtlkl ..... .t.th-.t .. Soviet .... theA.t:le .. 1 ....... · 
were able to, take ~q~ of, th4 'nita lath- .tIl ... w.. 
slnee _h w-.l ~JlUd nth aPPu-t1)t ~lWlbk.'_biems 
themsel~.F_ the Sovl.et., tbe:""bl_ ... ;c~.t~.,the 
, , : f" " ~, '\ " .' r ' , , ._"' ;.- .,., ,'~' '; .. _ ~i l-
Unlted.St.t~, '~tNUD .... the' U8._ !-fol'8O¥et". b ..... l..-ity 
was the·.try Col'ldltlon of flexlbility for the le.ser power. 
since tb6yweh'.t,l~ eo"manipuillte io wldely 'wide',:/ th; '1'1'0:." 
teet1veumbrel1i"rit ttt'elr guardian.'5 The re8~tt ~t the~e 
pc)tttleal tnlluinces as well as th~" ee~nOmtc' rehaibl1tatL,n 
of !!urop6" haa been' the rediseovery of their bdependent' per-
sonalitie. b).-:many '~f'thenatlons of Europe; P'ran~e. since 
,'be'ls nOt MbtOlled in any .erloua'· crisls' or her .~. was 1ft 
an enviable pa.ltton to eKpt~lt thl •• ituaelon.~6 
. eom.-ntart.. 1n' the Soviet Pre.. during this same period 
ot re4t.cOver, revuled that the Soviet Unlon was undergoing 
a polley 4Daty.is at.tiArto that of' the W •• t. one 8ueh 
I ... II 
35.1"~11."~"tHnehR"otr.ttOb ot1l1.cOri. '~,p; '642. 




statement vat the followt.rlgt 
The d~lopment of international relatioDs has 
_broughe the !uropeaa .'at .. aquarell up agaln.t . 
the need to aet up auch a system of eol actlve security 
. lit ~•. Witbin whOle fram..,rk 1t! veuldbe "pGeelble 
to find solutions fo.... the problems not only divtdlng 
the '8Mi.1 tlf.aftd cattle_Ii.t ltate. but 41eo ",MCb. 
tenslona 1ft relationa b_eween the Western Powers 
tb .... 1.... . 
Theae ~oblems cannot be solved by the imperi-
.tl.1: (oft_ eal1ed·'C ... dlllordll f) poltC7 based on all 
artlflqal op~.ltlon of one I~OUP of Eurqpean atates 
t.0 lblOebft. ,the fomlnl' of t She ml.lltat'Y and pol1etc!41 
S!OUplngs,. ~awa1 arms rae,.,le$allzeC! domlnation 
of th. Itl'Oft8ea. p.,.,... aM netftetion and l.nfrlngement 
of the .ovuelgnqtof the ~urol:*U" statel. .. 
Ie '1.'" thee...., .. tnt ..... ot all ~e ItftO~ 
.~.t.. ~olf.lp .. t~.fM '_l~.t peflC!e.ndseeud..,.. 
10 pr~·,th •• ~4 ·01 mseteu _.~lft ~pe • 
• pewit_lt; .t:hirtrrait.f. 1ft ~'Pont' ~ -fl. ~ .... ~, ,': 
<IeftIbl'~ •• ee"" j to. ~·theGeftut.rj ~1_ 
eo'.' , •• ful settlertWJntJ ,.d 'l!o impYOVlrJ ' .t.p~ b1 ~ep. th •. ,"l.tet~a .. " •• EUO. paan'.tate. be1.Oft&tns to" , 
oppow*' a.tad stat ... .)1;, .,... . , , ' , . 
!he poee__ *halt ... '4ittichthe AlDeneafts and the Sovleta 
posed ce one' eltOthft .1Id 'to ehe re.t of' the ..,rtd fo1md ita 
baate la eft. _l.ftftce ttl ;~trfMctl .. r *l,M.' .. 8e .. t:b dl • 
•• te lact d.'On11. perewhed • tVo-fold ftal1t,.;0tt . tHe 
one hand, ftet.ther of ebe.. """'tear .. '- eould 1M" .. terrawt ..... " 
on the ,other, ttwe,'11 ~ ,l""'P'.tft.' ·f!O t~k ttUtt ','art7' , 
ratlcmal letelSft l'Olky Would ..er"'ttoOllsider the depl~t 
of nuct_ weaptm •• ,'to'do 'sO: """let 'e*f'tablty rebtt tritM 
de.tructlon of both.'" 
ttfeb tl\e !O'V'tettfntOll .-In the ,at.ttlte. "trad 
» t.» f ttl 
37'1. lfo"' •• l .... , .""p._S_.rl~ .. Werl. '_e,-
IDSUUI&IIIII.".1.., (Moaeowr., Vol. 11 (,ebmaQ', 1965).p. 6. 
38Kell y • "Freneh Restoratlon of Hlstory." p_ 643. 
41 
evolved tn the year. following the war with the riaturalout-
come ~ln.a an advan.e...,t tn human d •• ires 8ftd wants. 8conomlc 
and 800141 conditions ln the.e nation8 W~. still una.tls-
facto1:'Y. nevertheless. with the tmp1:O\"EIment8 that \t'8r8 made, 
deslres ... 1' .... ed.Thus popular preS8U1:8 we 81so • potent 
force ln reducl. che virulence of Soviet pol1cy.39 But baslc 
to the .. eevaluati_ of eOllllt1ftl_ wh1ch d. (",a"ll. matte .... s the 
dlspute becween the Soviet Ubion and Chlna: 
" ' 
rla, allYl coacenll ... lts r.latto .... with the eut-
aWe, evwyth III 8elll appMX1I for Wd.l.a to '"' 401Dln .... 
• ted b, 1M dtlpute riththina.'Wl\atevel" happeftl in 
, .. c .. t.aa,_tha, the DAtlenal !'lv.trle'.'he- ~.r 
""Cgl ... lthlD tbe eo.muatst .. rldt the tft.vitftbte lnoomp.tl~llitl •• b.tween • relatlve y well provided 
natlon l1ke the Soviet nation and the countless pro-
le.a .. l ......... f Chtna. ac ... tna •• 'Hmaln tot.' a -
long tlme and wlll eonsequ8~tlY ma.ke any true (ooper-
ae",. blghl, probl_tloal. Q ' " , " . 
A'''l'l" •• "1960. de, ·aaulle had .at out co do all h. 
ow14 .. '',,.In, ."Ca readjuat_t .f the.Mb..... . Rltt 
,laa .... ·Ns .. 08 hi. co_ept of. b"tfty .anc1 ..... 1d ,.1itle. 
a. ft .... led, .. _c.alye-.s..t.pt 18to h1s futUHdl"l .... ey: 
na. d1'¥1 •• of ·the ,..,.1_ that- traM.lt,...,. 
and North America 18 the main fact and the worst evil 
of, OUI'tt.ae.:lVo _.,. a •••• t "P f.c. to fae_, under 
conditlons sueh that it depends sot ely on Moscow or 
. W •• b .... to. Whether 0". IIOt a lars& pa'l'C ot hulianit, 1s 
wiped out In a few hour •• 
1ft thefa.e.f hob a .,tuaelon, hac. d .... '·· 
that there 11 no ten1torlal disagreement ,O".ldeolog1-
eal dl8'pute th4U huany Iaportan". In c01llNl~llOft with 
the neeesslty of exorcis1~thls monstrous pertl. In 
rl'aac.·. vi_, chi •• ttuation impltes three conditions. 
t J, .• 1L $ It rtf] etkgp' 
,40 
Couve de MUrvl1le. ··French Pollcy <r.oda".' p. 615. 
..J 
42 
The lUlt 1. a detente, 1n oth,r.words. the bet-
tering of international rel.tlon., putting • stop to 
provocat.·lve aetloM and.peech •• aDd inereaslng trade, 
cultural exchange. and che viltta of tourtst. In ord .. 
,abata 1101:8 ,peacef~l atmosphere m.t.aJtt . be created, 
falling thl., the (lUts111e •• of d •• parat'lon would 
.ffllet dl,courqedmem. t.o .uc;h an .ten~ that one 
day and all of a sudden. tor ally re •• on at all, the 
WOI"ld would flnd1t •• lf at war ••• I.t W.'. tw,.ce In my 
liletlme. beeause tha Afthduke "a. dud o-rbeeaus. ' 
.OM o;:.w:::rndD:::lftlOft'lS 'a apeetttc' degree of 
colltrolled 4s.a~t •. preferably, abled at the 
devlces capable ot carrying bOmb'" .t't"a, eeglc dle,tanee. t 
I.. ord ... that. the poe:. lltt.l I.t1-..,.d , .t ~he .... tlme, 
the temptatlon--.uddenly to pr~ke general deeeraet10n 
.... b.. yuuh.· '., '. ,.., , ,'_ , ., . _ 
n,e tbird conditlon 1. a ",egtnnl'ftg of orgaftl ... 
coop.all_ betwe... Salt ··'and We.n: devoted to the .er-
vice ot man, • e1ther by helping in the progress of 
ua4erdnelop ••. ~pJ..IO!' by c.C)llaborat~OI, t.n.the 
g~ •• t projec'ts of SCt.Gntille r •• eareb, em whleh dttpeJkts 
the l\l~u1r •• , all. 4~ '., . 
~. 11 11ltla lfany dll.gre..-nt amona the mem~.r • 
• f the W •• tara alilance r8,ardlaa ~be d •• irabi11ty of 
'-""''''g C01'l'~C;C' and Qoopel'atloo with tbe S~v1.t UnJ,on. The 
q ... C'~ b eMt_"'l., b.",.cm the }hd.ted Scates and Franee 
regard' .. the ,C ... lag CMt tbl. pl'OC •• ' of .d~u.t.er&t mu.t have. 
The, Ualted Stat ... ppear •. 4Ilulte r .. dy la the •• rly 1969" 
CO ...... t.a dlleua,lou :wlth the $ovlet thllon that could 
.,."lbl,. haft hed la.tlDJ I.-portanc~ to th",. natlon. of ,Europe. 
~e Oa';l11. waa, of cour.e, opposed to any .uch inltlatlves 
or di ......... that couleS b an)' way lead to a lolldif1catlon 
-.. , ' . 
of ttl. ,,"ltton of the "jot' pew ..... ". ""'*' that.., such 
deal' a_4 be poatpQll4Ildfol' a ,later tble when Europe would 
I F I. i a J. III ;' .. , I I • II 1 I I" .1 I 
414- Ga11 .... M~.-_rtlftt.aa'. -~.'l .. o'French 
,'" : . .,.. "'1.<" • -
ro ... 1.gft Pollcy Following the 'allure of the SUDlftlt Conference." 
May 31. 1960, ~1g, A9d"., ••• p. 75. 
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be aulficiently strong to be among the bargatners.42 
Oe Gaulle has no illusions about the pttrpOse and intent 
of elthertheUnited Stateao~ the SOviet Union. He realized 
long ago thateheireflorts lh the lnternatlonal arena were 
_preillon. of thelr own nattonal lnterelts. IU:her a t .. 
porary accommodation between "thei. twonatioM or the con-
tinuatlon of tenatOnl were unacceptable alternative.. To 
avoid this situatton, de CaultehopedtO create a balanee of 
power whleh hecOftalde'ted 'to beeoruilttent Wlch the emerging 
political real1tt •• ; .~'h a b*tanee 'ttOuld be one that 8a" 
proper recognition to EutOpet.teohOmle and potitle.l devel-
opment •• ,; Aa uri, c i. 1 946~' "only' ,tx fnOftth.i.ftft re.igftlng 
power, de Gautle'deelared that be would favor. re.tor.tlem 
<21 atablilty ha'ed 'ioritfto'old! Wotld';" that '1ft spite '·"tageacld 
t .... gumefat* a~d dtlagreementl, the 'nation. ;01' tul-ope wout~ ""e a 
pOtent fOrce' In worldpOlltlel OM. agaln.44 
neGaul1e f a !'e.entd'le!'lt of ill. rot. played by the 
United Seates has been reinforced b1 'what haa been regarded 
aa Un.atlifaeto!'1 dlptom4lc,both'.tl:h re'pect to objeetlvel 




State. has retained a rigidlty Which resulted in the 10.. of 
lrretrl .. abl • .". .... 111.8 Jer Begollali .. with the s..tets; 
.uch oee .. ion. wIlea Ult4tl'ltal ctlM1'du nadued tbe SoYlet 
Union to,", dl"te.t1eally cfi.Mtlvantaaed weft the "'tll of 
Sta1b.- . tbe 19$6 1IP'tt.aiag.1D lola_ aM H1aqa1'1" "rioa-. 
ob •••• loe ,,'ca. r .. ar .... ia& ............ CD 11 .1 ...... 
ldeololY bu ............ al .aa\lll..... lC. ,abe· UbllAd 
State. t..- ~l.l'1aa •· ... luQl •• .,.,. Fol1owlaathe 
death .f 1(.,1 ••• ;'. d.. Jo ............. tn.t.oa ... I.lt.a* t.a 
aD eff.. .. __ ". t.e .. l,1 .fter the 1964 electlons, thls 
again nlafoned ...... h IJce,tt.Ot.s. 'abatt the altt.llt7 .I-Che 
Ua1 ... 'St .... ' .... peele f. Ike ~.wa.. ..s' .. 1N11. ..... Chat the 
ftM1 .... lr. ...... f .eGaull.-.fta1ollofJwope ... -lid 
ad w.talf_eowial.1lt: ... tl.oDa1_1111ca ... ·befOSDl t.n the 
laablltAy of '1M UIl1 ... ,...... ;Cake aub .... tial.COfttMl 
of c_ .... 10 .. _, •••• 1'. _pf.ttJ ... l'l_ly ..... l • 
...... .. e"'ilIsthlb ,,.. ...... ,.1101 ... 45 
,.1lOWi.llc eM w_. 4. Gaull. aIIIIOUIlCe4 lhalhe 1eotced 
.0 ........ ,he 4q .,--~ V01Il4· be tbeel .... l; of la'er-
....... 1 ... a.U1C)'.wb_,I-.ope wodd be able •• ,...'MIl' any 
.ti..ofif_ .ala1n,Mlpl'.I." O¥W all 0ItMn. 46'1hl. • .. 
...... e •• s.. "b ..... fwIcIa_cal t ...... 10 ........ pelle,. of eM 
rUtha .... lk' 
e r in iii '. st. Of It' IT • 1 
LtAd.:1:r.l~7~tJ:!:~;14 ~!~·2r:d Ch1na~ane." .lIa 
. 46S.h :by de 0.\11;1.' al Lill., OIl June 29.; 1947:1' ..... 
ill Rft)"Nl\ld .. ··EADla DlJ.lalat kblr'" u glUJ.l •• p. 14. 
.. 
4.5 
Now. 1n the last analy.ls and as always. It ls 
oal, In eQulllbt'lam thai the world· trl11 find paMa. 
On our old cont1nent t the organizatlon of a western gnu., ••• the "ey··l ... t equi •• l .. t to tll ••• hiah 
exists in the east} may one day, without risk to the 
tad.,.u ... t.ad tM freMom .f each .tloa and laking 
1nto account the probable evolution of political 
"St.mu. eac •• ll.h • IRopan eatent. fhtl the Atlantic'· 
to the Urals. Then Europe, no longer split in two by 
~'Il ... an. ldeo1OS'.' tnatvoufd·beeoae oat-.f-date. 
would again be the heart of civilization. The ace.sslon 
to prosne' of,tbe ••••• et',Allat lAl'nea aDdLalt.a 
America would certalnly be hastened and facilitated • 
. But al .. " the eoh .. loe of thi. areat a.· s_, . 
European community would lead VAst countries n other 
eoeH ........ loh ate ___ .... t_NI,..I' •• 1"'0 
,:~:~ ,!!;.::lc:t .io:!t;l<m, r~t~er t~. to yield t~ 
.. Gaulle·- baa nott.'t the worlds.. tbe daft ..... 
..... '1>1 •• 1t ...... t. ... , ......... .-t' ..... - efttleal wlt""t 
aa*.,tlas te·be _.~tt.. .... Ua td.a··cd.clAta.. : !h ... ..,t 
.. baI. .. _ aad .. td11_1_ ..... e ......... f ....... t. ef 
Ga"tll.t ',..,Utteat'th--r,'ctt.ua to&: 1 .... Ut'lWi811tg ·tAd 
•• oa.tl. ho,.. b',< reIIitalt4 world polittea! all._ II t. en 
wha.t: -"ns .......... lt:att.e 1'." ••• hal..... 0.. alteDlatlve 
.. tell .. : .... " ... ".. 1.1'1 eM: C .... l 'a> pt_. is .... lief 
t'Mt'<c:eMl'81 -.,.": .... : .• 4Um ........ Ger..,. _ld be" & 
..... f' ..... Mtw .. ' the EaBC and the West. By lneorporatlng 
the.e atat.,""te the eeOllOllleanct pol1tl.rld ay.t_ of both 
.",.... ... hioe_. ChaY would ......... eedto I.k _.ant,. behlnd 
t:he , ... ceeeton of one nor would e.ltber, of the hpet'powaft 
feel, Clomp.lled to; lead.· ..... lga aUJ)'POrt. A ..... plan to 
.• ' t 1 • .t I • In r t 
.'. 47 deaaul1er .. H4ddr ••• OUt.llDlna. tbeITlnclple.ofFrenr;h 
FOreir..roI1ey'0 lowing the Failure ot theSu.nit Conlerence," 
May 3 t 1960, lfIs10l" 6s1diMau. II. 78.' . 
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aehleve a ''ba.lanee'' was outlined by de Gaulte 1n an ofter made 
to Churehlll 1ft Movember of t944. This ptan was to eombine 
tOft.a with Gre.t Irtta'in 10 that thele twO~e.t.rt\ European 
natlens. '_,eeher with thelr then exlltlng empires, could 
.... 'ltuCe.~ tMpr ••• lve .e1aht tn world .ffalr_.But de Gaulle 
offered ,..t aMther alternatlve, that of an equtltbrium 
where 1ft a revived BUrope would be a -third 'oree-; this was 
a Yl.v of lurepeWh1eh lOOked f~om the Attantla to the Urals 
and hal .1ftee Men'. per'tst81ltnoeloft of aau11t.t '.reign 
,otley. 'l'h. exaet !tatur.of Chi. rWtved luropeha. never 
be ..... It. cl ..... fti.1 1t 'has been th.jubjeet df much eoneen. 
It l'd'ft,d.t.l~.b8_"able. 1\"",,1'. '~fto1lfd. a.ull.', vorl. 
attc1 diplomatl. !IIilWe. chat thil lurope WOtlldnot metud. the 
Aagl .. S ..... C t" plaeeof'''-u •• itl ft. 'also somewhat unclear, 
but he. $'.1'0,.4" ..., •• loawas "....,denled. Ancl y.tanothet 
.1e ..... '1"e ...... ilabl_ "totM pOle".r diplomats t a 
W4Wlcl ... ilf..b .. l., .... ed ... Fr4fte~6vt .. all1attee.' Thl' 
1 •••• 1 •• fti4tl ...... co.-lAttmtly 'flagarded' by tbeOeneral a8 
a nabnl and tlf'fkflClonaleefteOtrmltant to the 'POl1tiealOrI«m-
laClOft" of the t1frf) eouatr1 ••• 43 
'ftlt. 14.' of '(utOpftatlOft withehe Sovleta dat.. to a 
•• fpn._t.t.gly .. r1y d.celr.altzln~ 'that Aftglo"A.ertean 
btfl~e woUld M g.-at ira Europ* .fter'the "'.1', •• c..tte 
va. aware t.hat- a,I"'AREQSbnIDC wlth the Soviet Ua10a a18ht 
be nee .... ..,. 1"tteIIIIoD~ .. that ....... t.n t!d .• ' dlrfttton 
, -1;", , .. , " 
, , , 
I;" 4.. • ,4 a, .Ii 'r"', .. nru ••• fS' •• ,$,1 
. , ' 
4'* •• 1dla,"08 Gaull.'. Foreign Pollcy, U Pl'. 176-178. 
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were being made by Franee early in 1941. prior to the entrance 
ot the United State. into the war. He evoked dee'P-rooted 
leetings tor thi. idea by appealing to geo-politieal arguments. 
He eonstdered the United States and Great Britain to be 
primarily sea-powers, whereas France and the Soviet Union 
were continental powers with s1mil.r goals and problems. For 
deeades French schools had depicted France a. a regular 
hexagon with three marittme slde. (the Channel, Atlantic. 
Mediteranean) and three land frontiers (the Pyrenees, Alps, 
and Rhineland); this suggests, so they argued, symmetry and 
a naturally balaneed perfection. Thi. argument is national-
i.tic, traditional, and of very little importance In poliey. 
making. Nevertheless, this image has made its contribution 
to the thought of General de Gaulle.49 
The question that is presented, therefore, is of deter-
mining the direction toward which Soviet Russia must turn. 
The emerging danger of China, the increasing power of West 
Germany, and the continuing influence of the United States 
1n Europe (especially 1n Germany and Great Britain) serve to 
reinforce what de Gaulle regarded as a "natural" and "tradi-
tional" tendency.-that of cooperation between the Soviet 
Union and Franee. The only obstaele to this tendency which 
~~cr1dis could find in his 1960 study was the question of 
P F I • .. b • A Ar 
490avld Thomson "General De Gaulle and the Anglo. 
saxon ..... ~.·b!'T.··-YG.l.·.l.· (JaiPl' 19ft. S, 
.i .... ~.~~ A": t:. -'.~.l"'~ lIIII1 v;;;.:,l. flfl l.&r.t:r.. 19AI-J.l!tL (New Yor: luiiwla rv:ri'tty e~'" ·67T;P. r.-
/ ( II / 
/ 
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Algeria. Accordingly, today there is ample reason to specu-
late about this possible alteration in the world power 
balance. SO 
• t A 
'OMacridis. "De Gaulle's Forelgn Policy," p. 179. 
· PM'! II 
DIPLOMACY OF GAULLISM 
:' :. 
~IIl 
HlStoRlQ4L ,ASPll.Atl.OlfS NIB aiMllAL OIJECTIVES 
Qf DE GAULLE'S PORKIGR POLICY 
0. Oau1t.'. political philosophy embrae..tbe totality 
of the bt'enationat .e.me I 'he belieVe. that 'ranee ha.· 
re.pon •. lbl11t .... vldch '".'eb ... oaly bey_,~ ........ d.r., 
bat at .... leyoa4au.-opeeo the ! ... uner •• f _he world. .. 
politte.1 _ct. ... e8ftetf~t. the '~. ad .ecu.s.t:r 01 &he 
futlrre..Wh_ ""'.. lIi .... e y.... loos.ectac ebe Idll&ai7 
Ita,,'s ,.; tbepoll.er--ken •• t ··haft. Men fJapr ..... 'b,' the. 
lnIiplfte: .... .,.11 othet'tdttutr f~.1a '!We faoa of 
sueh ~ ••• _.taht.··th.'eft.that rtaeeeoutd b. so 
••• U.l,. p1Il ........ if 1t t •• eet .'-.ftateri ... ot ..... -'SOr 
powen tU.etat ....... to .hleve.' .... ctea ..... of 6011tteat 
ud military ~epGftd.ae.. De Gau.1.l. blht re,..tectlY _,re •• ed 
. .' , , 
hopeI ol~l.ttfta Fraae'elntotbe' poaJ.tloa when 'ahe c .. 14 
_ere!_ aft t.1Ide,endGbt 'f)C!Jltey and 4et a8 Ii cheek, after a 
.aA..... .. ....... pewel"ef eeeh of the two t.l1~erftfttoftal glant •• 
Thua. tM tttdepeadent polley lifte whlch de Gaulle 1. pursu1l'lg 
ts .ugge.tlft of the pa.e vb_ trance, under tout. XIV, served 
so 
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al the guarantor of world stabtllty.1 Such an ladentlfleaClon 
wlth t:be hUtOl1.eal 1"01e of Pnt1ee i.. clea .. l,. ill_traeed by 
the fol1 ....... bC __ t ....... tlh1ch tta\ll"tac baa ds.ne, .. 
att_loa, 
.. I I" I 7 I' Pd' • 
11(&1'01. "Po1Dcan aw •• l\a&lD. ... ,p.,698. 
ls,..h 'Y de Golla' al Bu •• -ftrft.Ma .. eh 20,1'64; 
found J.a M&un.aet, .Qa &MIll' p. 211 • 
. ', r 
S2 
ttttd oflere I ..... tltrnal ectopftatlora with 'e'rUl'Nleua eOftCernfo~ the 8overe~n personality of each eoun~.3 
In 1\18 dl'l~ f(W lnd~enee. d .. G .... 11e ha., .. })MD clJriven 
to take actionawhich appeAJ: quite pal"adcud.c;.l aJ'dUNftt1ei-
• .' .' . I 
pat~d. Beqa:4l ...... d •• ires ~o .trqthen the natloaal ~t:'. 
: , ' , 
he baa been forced to rut1!'t.ct, and a1.moat decimate ette army; 
, ,. ,'. , ': ' 
1ft an .ffcn:t to ..xi.mize the _t1onal.alo~. he baa li.beJ:ated 
1I08t Qt Trance '.colonie., and Allthouah . be is ~"-':U a 
political eonsenatJ.ve. he bas ...... the SppnaoQh1P9f 
Red Ch~ ln ln~fl1:Mt1onal pol1tlc8. All th1. be ,hM, •• to 
.chl ... "1.- .,...~ and ,',,-.tal loal: the ...... c,. .. 
, to. ". • 
bolmd~, 1!ld~ar&e. of 17r'U\C,e. t\ftd ben •• Ch t:tl~. ."on, 
to aeh~ev. Eu1:o~ t.Jld.penct~tI,l .. the coatimd .• feu,q. 
• seeond:Y,lta, l.I\ .plta of h1a d •• l.r'a to ••• « relaut:1a 
t ' J' ."', ' ..~ , '. 
of eolc1-.r ten.lons •. 4A7 l\8aqtl_1Qna between ehe Oattad 
Stat.. aDd the Sm.,t UnlQft to ~h FI'UoC. U not a pee, 
, " " ' ; " . ~ , " , ',', 
renew bla _ta.4 '.~.th.' CUfnht daeadethtJItur at: 
Amerie •. donilNltbhu ...u.t ..... ~'l .. t Ul'lCl1 .... .. _.t 
aontfoul.' .The mat.n t:8Uoft haa beet .. ,tbe at:eady t.nc-.. of 
, \' , ' , ' 
AmerleaJIbu.trt ... lft.'Curopa,'cnd· .-n. bc~-1tla hcbMlo.,. 
gap. I1t tbe6tr1y 1950'1, ;luJropeaft lftdu.Stry appeared co 
be reeoverlng 'and tmmydtlelpated the day when tl 1fOUltf 
eate~ wl~ ct.eunited State.. t. manty_yo •• haW ..... ' 
thll bopeha.,iheen di8'pellad. All lDtftGltlng bldleatft is 
I UI 1 •• • 
3C~ &a !lsM .. l .. "1hellol. of Pr.nee. II p.lee. 
4J •• n Daniel" ~eader of Europa and Arbiter Between 
Bloes. ft IB I_Ill. l Vet. I'! ,reb'.tWlty 20, 1965). p. 11. 
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the "teehnological balance of payment." (measured by the 
flow of lnternatlonal payment. for patents, llcena •• , and 
other lnat~nts lor the transfer ot technical knOwledge); 
ln 1961, this flOw favored the United State. ttveto Oft8. 
. . 1 
Another source of concern to We. tern Europe 1. thenbraln 
dra1n".-the .laratlon of aet.'ntlat. and englne.r. to the 
Unlted Statea. Although the Unlted States cannot reali.tica11y 
be accu.ed of deliberat.ly 8ngbaering tbi. fot'll of eo1.01l1allsm, 
n.verthelea. de Gaulle atill hOlds the Uftlted'State' hegemony 
to be the cause of thia .1lratlonl mOreover,". re.l1 ••• 
that the poaltlon of tb. United Stat •• 1 .... .;.nforeecfby It. S 
The etfect'that thls G.~llt.t r"llaatlon wll1 ha •• aft tha' 
Gener~l'. pollei.' can be perc;tv-d'bytaklftg. loOk into 
" . \ ~ 
hi. me.oirl, where he ap.akl' dlrecti~ to tbe Uftlted Stat ... 
coneeming French polleylndepeDdeneer 
, :' .In mortal danger we French have .untvad 'inee 
. , ,~be81nnlng of the century, the Unlted State. does 
not give ua the lmprea.lon that it regards lts own 
_s,ClaY .a Ilnkec:l, wi.th.c t~ of. France, that lt vultes 
Frane. eft btt 11!' •• t'nd'ltt0nl, that it 1, dolftg alt 
: le-ean, to help h.., .tol'emaln or become 80 ,~pce _&_In. 
Perhaps, in faet, "e are notvorth th.' trouble •. tn 
, .,tb~, .8!.t 10U" 4re,_Hsht. Bu~perbap._ Wfl shall,rls. 
again. Then you wltl have been wroga. In etther ease, 
your ""v101' tends to .a,11eute. U8. " ' 
,.Al~.·hq couWared the, indepandent poslt19n whlch 
, ; , . . " " 
de Caulle hu ••• UII8d to be the cotaaequene •• ot hlsed""eatlon 
and taml11 backsround~ Certai~ly durlng hls schoollng he 
, .!oc., I , F j , • , .. ' .• ,.. :,' ~4- 1 ... ). • ~ u. 
5ltctmo~d 'Taylor. "1M toni NATO Crlels, It IhI. R'R8l&II". 
Vol. )4<.1121. 1966)', ". 20 • 
. ' "'" ,-, ,. 
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W~I exposed to the writings of Charles Maurras. who has been 
referred to al the godfath,er~f European fascis~. Yet 
: ; _ .' f, .. 
de Gau~le found h,lmself afte:", the war owing hls political, 
military, and personal fulfillment to the nation which 
Maunas regarded as the cont_in~ous e~8m)' 0' France, It was 
through the help of the Brltish that France was able to 
maintaln herself ln the 1940'9, in faot, even as late as 
,,, ," , 
1958, Parls newspapers were claim1ng. tbat de Gaulle's.b1d 
for power was backed by the Brltisb tn order to e.tablish 
.)', . . , 
their man in office. The differences of opinion betw ••• the 
J .. ~ >" 
leader.f II'ranJa':and Ih.-ether le.d."I"t the .. "rlde .... be 
, " ~ \ y , " , • ~ • ;.' ~". 
explalft.,t" ~"e'.I.'" (an.·~· dtMibt th18. lsa ~()fttr1bttC1D8 
. . . . . 
factoralehoqh •• 'a'al, net 'het.tal_pl.~ttc:m). P.rJ:lf.ps 
," " :' " . ", "'''. '," " . _ \,", e' ,'" 
it was ,..itabletha, de Gaulle weal. -_ba,ly smsb those 
),: . '; ~ , 
who supported htm in h1. cr1tical.periods oflaadersh1p to 
" - ~., '.' I • • " , • 
symbollcally satlsfy h1s ~ co~,c1ence.to saY_DO~h1n.of 
his . C~~tlc8 ,1 
t~ the i4aA at .sbIiIa;d de ~aulle nqt.edthe qual1t.J' 
" " - ',. ' .•. ,' " '.. -, '. '". 
of leadersh1p whlch to him seemed GOlt noble. The pqwer of 
• t • . " ." • , " '. . •. I ~, 
decla10n muat be found.within the leader him.elf and not 
'~ . ~ " f 
1mposed by some extemel ordeJ:'. D, .Gaull.cr1ed~t fot' a 
task to ;'p~rform and. the freedom to' ~~rlorm the' ta.k.8 The 
task which he has discovered 1s to a •• ert the Independenee 
I I 
'Ray Ai.n."Anat~ of Gaullism. n iii. LIM.E. Vol. 46 (March 4,1963),. It. 11. " . .... . . -, ' . 
8da Caull_. i4aI. at'~ SWArd. p. 43. 
'5 
of IT .. e .M to .ecaplue bel' ,over.lpty. Franca 18 DO 
loa.erpolltlcall" l.,otent ~d,dapaad ••• upoa the Unlted 
State., the t.ak-for 4e G •• lle, therefore, 1a to .ake the 
.. Tld .wan that t1tl. eM.e bat ta ... , ,lace.. Fl'aDCe (aad 
, , " . . , . , . " .. 
w •• t ... ~pe)_ .... fus.. to c .. ~1rN' to ba, &ruted a. thouah 
it v~ ... clrel, d.,endeDS, upDft,A.-clcaa acoaomlc la¥ae,. 
aDd pollt~~lp1oma'lc aCqul .. cenc •• ~ 
V.ruat baa· expla1Ded wbat thi •. Oa,,111.t. decCldAatloa 
to be. b4.pandaC1IINJI8 ~ teqa; of tbe political, 
. -' D''''", •• 1.e tra. ' ...... t.l ca.ent ~·ll deltnlr 1.,- objeetil. de a pOl t que ext.rieur. 
lJaacaJ.l .. r D' alto"s, ... 1'.".,.. dlt. 40._ • la .. 
harte. 1. 'eapaelte de falre entendre all volx prop" 
et, ~e. pl'e"'_ la. 4n1tJ,aC~"" > .'0C'af' -a I.. ... .... ts. Hut precl.iment, .ffermi!' daftl tou. Ie. dOmain •• 
"valu •• ,1'&anpe_.OGcd ..... 1.t·_t.~ q •.• ell.-l 
pullse a'aftirmer COllIDe un. rea ita, notl18eul.eftt 
... o~u •• _~ politt,,,,,.~ .Uit.!.r_. _!' •. "" 
~1&w toeM.at .. aceat y...,.", an "lcleololY_ of_ .... 
veal ... " ...uCed ... ~M.wada of -the f .. e,S,p ,011£;,. ........ . 
The cSl,ft.ew.ty of plamd, ... tl'at.., with_ ..... than two, pl.,. ..... . 
w.. .sUfle .. lc. -.tat a H8Ull 'bee".. a Cead.-c,. CO foq. 
all facte 1aCo Che •• ru.s_t pldel.Qea of the .uteRt 
blpo1a .. world. la .• UCA ." woJ:ld, of cOUS" •• the _l.t..ou 
.1 t.l ..... -.-ber. had too. .v.bordlnatt. ~o -ClMt d-.culou 
01 the ,,_,e pcwer:ftd .-bar. of . tbe a111aM.. Thu.I 1a .. 
• ffOl't to ~ t.he vor:ld .. • lIOn "_1.ccab.le.pl ... -, In, 
ad 
.. '" . . . " . -,. ., 
Anglo-;~=!,!· 6ii:=1, Jta.:=l Q=~h~V;!f. a,am;l~; 
1964). ,.. 39. . . 
lOv..-.aac, "Foad.enU at Objeotlf •• "p. 46.5. 
• II I 
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which to 11"., independent national effona have ben ltororagly 
resiated.ll t;e Caull •• however. revoltedala1rtst cht- extel'llal 
lnlerfet"ftftee in Preneh policy; moreover. he wa. ccmvlneed 
that the context of international polities bad changed durtng 
the pre"Wloua .eea.e. 'ftle 'bal.ftCa of terror ~eed by the 
nuclear stalemate 'hal prodU4M in tbe 1Id.ftda of the I't'eneh a 
eonstant "'Ptcton of the major .etora in world pOlitie •• 1! 
The Amftlcan e ... taton were in "b.taftttal agretmieftt tha. 
the ttt-.n ••• whieh the United Itat.. IhGWed t.n tft.Cuban 
ml •• lt. erial. abOuld haw ·beeft polttl ... ,.nof to the.llies 
that the cOIIRitMftt' of the United: Sta ••• · w ••. g.nu1M. IUt to 
de Gaulte, this .leuatt.eta re-e.tabilibed ht, , ...... 'ear •• 
Aware that 1ft: .~. prevt.... yea... the ·Unitetf State. ..." .t.dItft 
weakne.. In ... lbaS vt.th the S.neta on theCe1.'lD&n . \qiaeet loft , 
the c_eralooneluded that fl~' w.seYi.eneed lit Ibl, 
ca8. CJ1l17 beea._ it inwt...... a· cJl~eett""eatto ttl.· Dnlted 
Stat... Thus the firMne.s ower .ueh dlreetthreat. onl1 
contined the doubt. t.n the"rtmeh .inds regaWinl What help 
theymlght raeal... 1f thelr lnterdt •• ere thr •• eened.13 
'It t. .1pltlcaftt t Nlwf.t'ft1:. that de 6aul1e haa 11 ••• '1' 
denledh1.m •• lf the polltteal barsatalltg poWer ttutc he hal by 
beblg loo •• l, ••• oeiated nth· the Ublted State.'ln the Attantic 
Al1taftee. Am8Ii.can po .. has been eODftftiently e.ployed to 
t r 
llKetly, -tl'rench ttMtoratlcm of 'ttl. tory , • pp. 646-47. 
l!Crabb. "Oauillet Revolt," p. 40. 
l3GrossGr, nForelgn Policy of the Fifth Republlc," p. 203. 
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.ene .a a wamlDa to the So.t.eta that &111 _Jor att-.,t to 
d1slUPt the present power l'e1atlouhlpe ......tel r_lt ln a 
major confrontatLon with the United Statea. At the 8am. time, 
France uees evert polltleal tatle at her 4"8,. •• 1., to pQl"8ue 
an ambltioua polt.c, withcNt tmtrwheW.,. _lltary might. 14 
l1ftder ,1\". cir_Caneu , .. aneta has .,... • .,1. _ •• __ .c 
to manlp\llate, beth· ,he UnlCedSqt .. and ,he :Se"#lec'uat.-. in 
an .ffon to _ge a. CM' a .. bl, ... b.twe.n .• h ... ·ewe fo .. e •. 
The abllol ,~ .... an In han81\)' with the long-range polley 
alms of a ."bstaJJltal s .... _ of Che "'iou-'hea. wltle"" 
eomprl •• • the ~~I;a1l.t" "th1l'4l- 1t'O.-14 ... ~ullt_~l"'''·· 
the bellef ,hat all .. tlon41 .• 'tf ....... c •• ~ .. g.,iated 
".. , , S" ' '." '" c " . -, '.' • '1' '-:~.; . " <" ., "r, , ~ 
and e •• b. h.olft.,tb_h cll,loatIf.7i .... ttl. ~'e.he't." 
whieh cltGautll,;.hjl1.-.'· beloaa. t .. 'l1 ....... t., ...... lt.~S 
0.0.11... lluei. wt •• "'. 1"_*"7 of '.ac ... 
his det~tloa:,.,t to allow 1M 'alat ...... ' ... t1., of 
"ranee bet CGfttbgarit upon the deelalon8 made in capital. other 
than Pari. 11 .emethlng 01 an echo" II"Om the mouths of the 
, , ~ . 
neutrali.t leaden.' It i. eharaetWtatle. it ..... 01 natlons 
. 
that aft att_ptlng to build their 'powertobe very adamant 
in thelr"" ref.41 tob_oates' satelllte of 'any major power. 
Pranee, llkewl.e, although being 11 .-bee' of the We. ten 
Allianee, Is quite Ul'IOIil11ng to allow her po8t.ti~· co be 
JI1t b db I , I a 1 , • 
~!ti.·Burope to the Vratl," P. 13. 
l'enbbt "Gaullt..t Revolt," pp. 40-41. 
S8 
defined automatically. A nation cannot be indlcted beeau •• 
it strive. :'to' satls!,. its Own \,eeds and respdnd to itl l'lactonal 
imperatives .16" 
In a significant explanation of his pOlitics. d. GaUlle 
explained what French independence would mean: 
Franee, beeau.e she can do so ... because' everyehtag lJW1te. 
her to do .• 0. 1t-.caule ,beu Fl"ane!.. ahould c~, 
amidst the tIOrl,d a wortd pOl.1CY. Tht'Oughout the year 
whuta u belAmd.nat we wUl . thua tfftk ttJlta¥"d eM .eMae 
major taakl 11'lCumbent upol'l u.. The unl<m of Kurope ••• 
ctt. PI'OP'U.of cl""lo,~ ,QOUDtl"l ••••• 4contrllNtlon 
to the maintenance of thapaaee. 
'. .. Aa I~ '", ~.tobj"tl"t .. 'here al'8 concll.~OIl' impo.ed upon us. Firstly, we aniat ,·pur.u. the .,toft 
whloh 1"'1.11 eq~~ U8 "L~ • ~Z'1IIOft\lel .. r 81'8 .. 1. 
the only one with a power inadequate to the threat of 
........ iDa ..... ~ .. '17 .~ _1,. .•• wbtAb".tlowa 
us 1ndependence ••• we wIt, wlthout glvlftalnto the 
l1.tuat.oM .i.ft wblob the ..at lull ~",.l"St·, but without 
loeing the hope that human 11tierty an.·' d dtgt\ ty wt.l1 in 
"tu ......... 1.1 ~ ... t .... ,teavlaa.e theclQ 
when ••• the Communi.t total tarlanreglme. Which stlll 
.... .-d.1aooutl:~llllal eo,afJ.ned ,.ple •• violl 
Iradually come to 4ft evolution eompatlble wlth our own 
. tl' .. f~loD. 'Ih", thue, ... 1t1 be qpeD to Surope a. 
a whole prospect' 1ft keeping with tts resourc.. and 
. lCI, •• pacitie.. . ." '. " , . 
. ~ ... 'en ob.e""8,,, .. DOte .,~Ilat ,de Gaull_ 11 attempt1ng 
,. f ..... hi •.. ova polt.c~e •• att .. ClDa to .... rt tbet, tDd ... 
p.ad .... o~ his Dation. SilDiflcant example, of the , .. reb 
for lrt1el*'dece are. 'he. 'reach att8lfpt' 10 clevelop... J'IW, 
partnership with We.t Germany, the publlc recoanltlon of a 
, " "..,...' , " <, , v :1. • . . • ~. • 
dlv1de4 ~Y. ella l"eflop.1tiol,l of c~t..t China, the 
d.t.n .... t1Oa. to. '.a. ,1' ..... ova . .-:1881' ar.enal. and tlle 
b I • 
161W., pp.-' 39iii4o.· 
17d• C.ulle, "N'ew t.ar', M •••• ge ... Dec_bel' 31. 1963. 
p. 244. 
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reeent initlativea toward a Franco-Soviet accord. 18 
B •• 'he tnalateace .f aha r~e .. hqpoe 1Dd.pend .... ia 
not a ".la1 of 'hell' e ........ 4lC_lCyI 1f 1. _&Di. any 
way be '"tfl". 1 ........... ,. a 1 ... 1a& for peace aad aeeurlty. 
They dealre to .seape the need to choo.e the one to whom 
they must turn for aeeurlty. not the •• na. of securlty it.elf.19 
Thll ha. frequently been tai.understood. not only by po1'J111ar 
opinion but al.o among tho •• who should be better info~d. 
Acheson reeently criticised Gaullist polley for rejecting 
the .eeurlty which the United . Stat •• elaims that it pro.1des; 
he regarded' the poliei.. of the French to be sueh that the 
world WOUld be projected intoln."tt~bl. t.neiner~t'on.20 
A more pereeptl. .. analy.is, howe .. ~ would reveal that the 
'rencha" lnter.'tedin any efl~rt.' 'that ~uld allow them' 
.,' ,-, 
aome .. sure of .eeuritY, positioned a. they are so wlnerably 
in tbe't:enter of a world that I.. anything but at peace. 
, ' 
Any wi ...... l .f .~ .............. 10 ... ··auel_r veapoaa 
, , . 
cannot 'be ................ '..-ehef.vonbb" 11 1t ........ 
to 1 ..... _ .. t ....... , thtft 1t ... the WOI'ld .ha .... ,,:. 
':21 
more ....... 
...... 1' .. ,1948 .... oaull.,;I" ...... l .. hle poa,.., .... euch 
, 'r f'" 
., I 1 an.; it . , 1t 
18cc-.... "Gau11u& a.vola,," pp. 41-42. 
19."';";Webft.· "AaAmtiowa .PW1d.. Freneh Pol1cy, 1959,' 
QlnIDClla..",~, Vol. 36 (May, 1959), p. 274. 
2~"""'. lOBi. fa""¥' at :Ct,."., aa v.II'l •• p. 1S. 
21webft.'''PhMb POlley." p., 276~ 
• 
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for French securlty and lnde~hdence a 
I belleve that .e must defend Iurope ln Europe, 
and t bell ...... that by 1fi .... of 1_"".·, .hi8tOT)", 
and.allo p~ycholQIY. Europe cannot be defended in 
toftdon ••• Thla t. 'S qu •• eton wevl11 have to cake up 
agatn, fo~~. th~ preparation of _possible wa~. franee 
_It be ttfe 'eenip' of the fJt"r8ftgth aftd serategy of' 
W.star.n Europe. . 
'1'0 clarify anY,doubte.and .U8W81: his maay crltic •• , de Gaulle 
elaylfled hi' notion of the relattonehlp between Fraace and 
.the United Stat_1n • p~"8 cOllf.renee 1n 1963. ae explalned 
. ,.' " . ;, " 
that there wou14be no quutlou thet ~ t~ event qf I .. 
ujorc4tftlllc::t. rD'~c. W,OUld be on tbe ,1d. of &he United 
" ",' . 
Stat.. But th~ 1. not th •• ltU&t;l~ ... now c01lf~t~ the 
pol1cy-makers.There should be .ftOth~ dl.tr ... t.~1 01' even. 
aurprl1u.a in ~h.f.ct that., .natlona ft\1ahttalke ... "lfferent 
< , • " , • • • 
"Ppl"oa.ch t() tIl. c",tlnl~t qUJ.ti~" . a1!'t.'ba 1n lntematlonal 
attalr ... 23, De (!aulle Was even ~.expr ... lve 1n an earller 
.tac.-.._t: 
'. ... Yet, until ve achieve an organtzed peace. if 
''that 18 at all PO' •. lh .. !f!\PftDC. e .. b'tenc:l8 •. a.8 far .as she 1. concerne4. to be r~ t~d.fend. har.elf.TI\l. • 
.-an.. ltr.'" of all. ~t ._hal11'emU.n '1\ Ultepal pan ot the Act.'1c .. Al11ane •••• ,01tt .111JnCe . appear •. 
a I1v", ,.. . tltt. III Q1tde""tOl", lttobee_.,.fm ... 
• o,N8ilc. must. ". .. ,,* ova. tot. 1n .tt, ~. "ftr OWl 
p81:', .. tlty •.. tht. .~ .. roI111. t#la ... t.b. "'·_.'t ... _qutn 
a,.msct-... a~tt~lDe. other. ~..,tm.·t~t .he 
\lUI ... ~ .. b,.801a m18tftt8. ,s, O .. f. her '" ... ~.o- qa. harten ... -t~J ltl Ihol"C, «bat ber d .. Ct.ft1. alttaoun •••• lat_ 
with that of h.'.11'le.. lIl.t ~tn 1" lift oWn lUlads. 24 
J Iii; I.. . ... $, If I t ;;;;r: I ". I . JU , I ,. • ,.. It ... I •• 
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This vas • vartati., of the th.. that da Gaulle ... 
peated tlM aII4 .,..... III AI. 6aIr 1Il.sM bCKlb de Gaulle 
-aued that clef ..... , be the _1tlaea ,1".1'014'1 ... f t.be 
.c1Oft, tid.. dety· ...... be delee.eeel to ...,. otber .• ca...-
atat:. DOC all...,.. .. "' -.tie COlIC ..... upcm anoth.'s d .... 
el.10ft.. Jus, .. lle ....... ,1'.... Ie uti. he .. &Mutriel 
and tecn.1eal.cel Icaow .. t.t to ,dey.lop • .-buiBed U'I'IY. he 
has ROW .PP .. Led till •• ~c'to the .... t:J.on' of .-.laar 
arument. Without .\leh Dili .. ", ad I'Ot_tl.a~.. • natd._ 1. 
re1egat..l _. 'st4lte of ~otal de~ upM .111.... What 
. . . . 
adds to the 01''-'" of _""h .' ." .. c1_ u·· t ... knawladae that 
there am be 1'10 I\IU'DC_that . eM: t ..... t •.• f, aay, .lty .ill 
alway. nrnalllcOJDp'Uentuche bte'.N8t8 of , ....... 1.'hua 
without: ..... 1.." of her awn, Franee would always be at the 
merey of beCh ..... &11,..25 ., .. hapel ~ _at del""t"" 
Ga1l11 .... tat ..... "S&cdtn&&ht.s aearcb f.- IflOti1I:"«Y ... the 
follow11ta. 
_ •• PIli. 
• u •
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of d.,erri.! it from heing .0 ... , aceorelies to ,be 
clrcumatance8, the .-an. of as.lsting 1n t~1 delenaa of 
It •• 111 ... lMitldtaS"4h(J ltftows ....... le •• , . 
He tben ••••• i .... hiftls.lf to the ..., oot'e of Ca.1118' foreign 
Poll" .a he •• t'.H.ghtaoualy .ast • glue.' OPOlf hi •• ..,.· aad 
at the .... t1tl4t cOft.Uen. ,Il. 'u_ .. , 
'1ft ••• 'oUr eouall'y, '.,.t1a.l1':;chre ...... , 
fiads It.elf onee as&ln faced with the neee •• lty of 
,. ••••• lMS th_ mO.' pOWerful .... ,..... of the 1ft tnt I e ••• 
of c~.t the others 08.S. to ~ •• e'l t~em. However. 
to tllisuide ·ut. tb.. vole.. of ''''''11 t.,. anti .... B.81' 
are a. alway. 81~ltaneopaly ral.ed. 'Xt II ... le •• ,· 
.ay .eme. l '1t i",,, e •• tl,.' say •• h..... The •• 
,.1,.. r .. -. listened to. _ometl __ and to her td.s. f......... Mtebl,'" tr. ... of t"8 evo hr.. "". 
h .. ..,. art,,'l...,.,' they acla11led in concert 1ft 1914 • 
... • 1:'IIOhi eOI't=4, nO "ahter .lnnfl,' the.... . 
backwal'd ad brat.ftl.a •. I'WIUra er1ed II,l al.Oft befoYe 
19'9. But Iht. It ... · •• ··.ha 1 IIOt all_ 'l'e\dt.n. aNt· 
111\18 ton to Uwt.te ilw.alOft of our country. Moreover t 
b' EM _dl' of Itt.· ICNbed and daogenus WOI'ld b 
. whlc~ we 11"J70\S1' chlef dutr 18 to ••• trong and to 
. M oa.s.t.... '.. 
Oerhol ... de a ~o~leclt. •• a ........ c of Amari.a' • 
.... t .... t •• &uror- aftd 1t val Illa eOMlualo. Cbat th. 
_clear ..apoM ef 1M Unit" Sta ... cll' notco.ltlt"te .. 
guar_'" ef luftfllJ'hlt leeul1.ty aitt 1enler4; R. "ased his 
cone ius ion Oft (tee.1 evettt. ~d on th. .tat..... and eplftlens 
, ~ : i. 1 N, ',- , 
of eontempen", polltteal l .. de"· III the tJftl... S...... 'i'Mre 
was little 4euht, aeeM'tllag to thl •• t_,..·· .hat .". t1alte4 . 
,;: i- ". " 
State, would not risk total annihilatlon unless its interests 
Ft ••• ' Ub ~ ,t., Iii., 
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were directly ~lated.Z8 The Itrategy et -gradual rel,enae" 
Whieh the pol1e,...k~ ot the UnttedStat.. ~rejeet.d ift 
reeent ,ear. fall. to give the ~h the aeeurlt,y they 
de.1N. The Gatalll.t cone.pt of !\trope •• I.urit, lftV01".8 
the baed ... ,. DtletU1: "pI'1Ia1 launche41 a.atna. aft _uYe •• or' s 
homelbd (especla11,. ht. _jot" cltl .. ) tft suver '0 any major 
otlen.iva 1n Europe. Thus no NA'ro eommand and United State. 
troops would be necessary. Such a battle could be tought 
and won by the rren~h forees alone. 29 !hi:! ~en.e of natlonal 
responsibility is a natural eOfJcommltant to the revival of 
France as a political and economic personality. France has 
refused to, allow her personality to be swallowed up in inter-
nationally organized struetures; the ~reneh are demanding 
the right to org~nizetheir own seeurlty.30 
The coneepts of seeur1ty and independenea are clearly 
joined to history and explained aa jo1nt politleal t.peratlves 
by de Gaulle in a speech delivered before the officers of 
the Ecole de Guerra in Pari. on November 3, 1959. 
The detense 'of Franee must be Freneh. That is a 
_at..,. wlU.ob hea a.t a1...,.. .... too .. 11 .. 4 ...... 
in recent rears. I know this. It 1s absolutely elsen-
8lal I.bal • ~ reeopl ... atee.... Wltll. 
country l1ke Fraftee, if war should come. then that war 
... t ... hw .... Ita effort .... c 1M her .ff.11:. 11 
I' nIl' I II , -' JI db '¢ 'iii • 
2St er: ~G""l.t •• ~ .... Great r..r. N IftM. 
from ~ . i Stockholm; reprinted 1n 6S1", Vol. S 
(April. 1963. p..,. :l4. ,. " " . " . 
29Geap 'w. Henld . ~ "the."kiM to. De Ga .... 1l •• n l:Ia 
LusS.E. Vol. 49 (l-tarc:h 21, 1966), p. 6. .' 
lac ...... Mun111e, "~h Polley Today, fI pp. 625.26. 
it vere oebetwl... ottr country would be acting cGUfrtft 
to ."erythi.l\a it baa be... s1.nceJ.t,' 0I'1g1n--to lta role. 
to ita •• tl.r..pee~, to its veyY lout. Naturalty, 
ahould abe occu1cm a.r1te, French aetense should be joined wlth that of other eount'ti.ec.That t.s ln~e 
Mt •• ,ofCh~.. But:ltis lMJ..~_l.ble that our 
datens. belongs t!o us, that' h-auee tta~end hewell by 
betaelf. foche1:'.elf~and in her cpwtJ •• ,. ••• the 
govel"nman. ef .' aJalaD . , . . 1s te dalettd -eh.f..~egrtcy 
of the tenitOC'1I! ItQ" .a fJ:QII thU. neceaalt,_ 
Iapeelal1y tn FYancet all our yegtmes have been' based 
on eheit. abULt, to dOao. 31 
lha fucurea8C;luric,. of Fl"AMeWa$ to be a deflQl.te principle 
... the Gaulliat fora1g11. pol1.~1 of th.e • 1xt l.a • In whlltever . 
"4Y thu aeQUl't.t)' coulcl best be ach1.eved,. tbeGen_al was 
4et"=illad to d"~u. Slld ~h dlp1ouc1 to achl~et 
'''orto .• awiltrQf:;O \n kltiUUlY he plotted a <:ou ..... ' which 
". .. '" . ~ '. 
clW ., ~11Ade ., fut:Uft.lt~t:1ve.. Heexpl.1nedl 
.. 
''La Frace VANe a •• =e~ .... del ... e,alle ft. veu& pas etr • 
• ,.buae' .... e& ell. .. i.it al1lance avec le. &\1tC'ea P4Y. , 
,- ," . \ , 
1lbz' ... "".. _ ,.. .~r. ........ *i •• .".. •. le couvert de 
"," , , ' 
••• al1~ .. elle te~ la .. 1na~ autr .. peuple •• HJ2 
.', . " ,. ,'- ."" 
S ..... coua1aa tq power LD 19.58,. de Gaulle 1la, be. 
t1;rt.va by 'hU obJeot 1ve, of part~l,.tba 1n world affaire 
18 the f~ont rank and as.~~i r •• ponslbl11tyfor the security 
.f Fl"an,.. these two goala of 1.Dde,pendenee and ,.curley, 
'hu.fore, .. , be cOQaldered 1n thelilht of a thlrd goal. 
that of .,galtey. Resardl ... of what the foret..a_ pol~e7 
., . , 
experts and military analysts might argue. de Gaulle believes 
'lQUoted tn Maer1dl.. lmPl1G,b1, Al1x, p. 133. 
'2Speecll:· •• 11"1...,., S.Pt ...... '19hICf_r.d la 
fa,'eton, De Gaulle Parte. 1959.1962. P. 403. 
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that Great Britain (and perhaos even 14ast Germany) occupies 
a privileged position within the western camp.33 Thus the 
strategic problems of defense which confront France have 
been considerably enlarged in scope to include political 
dimensions. Nuclear weapons and independent responsibility 
for the defense of France are necessities to the independence 
which de Gaulle hopes to achieve in the diplomatic sphere. 
Yet there is one substantial factor that must be used as a 
frame of reference in approaching the notion of equality, and 
it is in this respect that the objectives of the Fifth ~epublic 
bear a marked similarity to those of the Fourth: this equality 
is desired by France, for France--not for any of the other 
members of the ~lestem Alliance. 34 Only io the moat recent 
years has Europe been reborn as a political reality; wrope 
is confronted with the strange problem, therefore. of choosin~:: 
the direction that her policie. will pursue. And it is in 
this respect that de Gaulle envisions that the greatness of 
France can be achieved. He has forced Europe to think for 
herself. France was rebuked in her hi.d for a front-ro\.] seat 
as a maker of policy for the entire western group. He has 
turned to Europe, then, 1n an attempt to assert himself as a 
leader. Immediately after he returned to power. de Gaulle 
made it clear that France did not intend to be limited to the 
33Grosser. ft'Foreign Policy of the Flfth:~epubllc. II 
r>p. 204-5. 




role that currently was hers. Although 1t was supposedly secret:. 
de Gaulle addressed a memorandum 1n 19S8 to Henri Spaak. Prime 
Hinister Macmillan, and President Eisenhower pointing out the 
lnequalityof the political order a. it then existed. 
Dc aaulle proposed the establishment, within the NATO frame-
work, of a "directorate" to be composed of the United States, 
Great Britain, and France. This group, which he hoped to 
establish, would concert poliey and serve as the decision 
makers of the Western Alliance. He concluded this memorandum 
with the threat that ~rance would reconsider its western com-
mitments if its bid for a position of status were rejected. 3S 
Part of the original plan set down by de Gaulle would 
be the extension of the influence of the Western Alliance 
into areas other than the Atlantic region. In this way 
de Gaulle hoped to re-establish the position of France 
throughout t~e world. The refusal by the United State. to 
allow Prance to participate in the formulation of global 
pollei.. forced de Gaulle to look for a different way to 
achie~e the equality he d •• lred. 36 
It soon became perfectly at .. r that de Gaulle intended 
to use Europe as rhe vehiele for 8chl11Vlft8 the role he desired. 
na took to himself the cause of iurope altd beeame the prophet 
of self-reliance; and he pursued this role with a passion. 
3~emoral'Mlvm of Septemher 24, 1958. fo\1DCl, In Mae:rldis, 
"De Gaul!efs Poreign Poliey, II p. 182. 
360 • War •• I', "Pr •• ldeat de Gaulle" Foreign Policy," 
~Qrld Xad'l, Vol. 18 (August, 1952), pp. 323-24~ 
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Yet hi. almo.t p.ychopathie aver.lon to any genulne unton of 
the European natlon. made hl. real ambltions that much more 
distinsui.hable. J7 If Europe eould be united, 80 de Gaulle 
reasoned. then it would be .trong enough to resl •• both the 
Soviet Uraion and' the unt.tedState.; 1IOYeover. it could lerve 
4S the mediator between these power-giants. And if Prance 
eould assert leadershin of this new foree, then the equality 
which ls so dearly coveted eould be achieved. The appeal 
that de Gaulle made in hls bid to unite Europe behind his 
leadership was two-fold: he appealed to tradition and to 
the historical ~o.ition of Europe as the center of the world; 
on the other hand, he promised not only security but also 
independence once equality were aehleved. 38 Daniel suat\Arized 
this aspect of Gaullism in the .following way: 
Neither war nor peace, capitalism nor communi.m. con-
fllctt.~ ldeolog' •• nor raeial dtfferenc •• are really 
tmportant to him. He is quite willing to acknowledge 
so.e truth of the moment which will flt·.om. t.aue of 
the day, 80 long a8 Franca can share, on an equal 
fOOting with the Great Powera, the leadership of the 
world. And so long aa he~9de Gaulle, i8 one of the 
people dotnS the leading. 
In the very earliest month. after the war, 4e Caull. 
had already begun to ma~e hi. appeal to rebuild the power of 
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43 (April, 1965), p. 489. 
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i~at then, if not the old, can re-establish the 
equilibrium between the two new ones? The old iurope 
that for so many centuries was the guide of the 
universe i. in a position to constitute the nee.s.ar" 
element of compensation and comprehension at the heart 
of a world tendlng to splie in two. The nations of the 
ancient Hest, whlch have for their vital arteries the 
North Sea, the Hedlterranean, the Rhine, geographically 
situated between the two new masses, determined to 
maintaift an independence that would b. dangel'OWlly 
exposed in ease of a eonflagration ••• 40 
The position of France today is readily observable. 
~fuat de Gaulle seeks of Europe is not a unified entity, but 
rather a group of nation-states, acting 1n concert, under 
the direction and leadership of France. To achieve this 
desired goal, an appeal has been made to feelings of supra-
national solidarity, £uropean pride, a natural desire for 
power, and the prospect of future prosperity under such a 
aystem.41 De Gaulle realized that France could never discover 
her post-war personality if there were need to continually 
search to achieve security. It would be senseless to expend 
energy to attempt in vain to maintain a colonial empire. 
ather the initiative would be discovered through a facility 
of being present and acting, as an autonomous power, at the 
most auspicious t~e 1n the sphere where political activity 
would be most cruclal •• that ls, ln the realm of the Cold War 
struggle. But de Gaulle also realized that France would not 
be powerful enough (from the demographic, economic, or 
milltary points of view) to enter this arena as an equal 
• • 
40speech at Bar.le-I~, July 28, 1946; quoted in 
Maurlac, • g,1I'll~P. 171. 
41Hulzlnga, "Whlch Way Europe," p. 490. 
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unless ahe would 8ucceed in assembllna around her 4 number 
of the European nationa. This was the way de Gaulle ~lanaed 
to ducover Europea this wu to become a basic goal of the 
Fifth Frencb ~.publlc.42 
Yet 1t must be noted that beeau.. of the C:0RI81ttaent to 
le4de~.hlp of the ~pean group, the French have not lessened 
their desire to occupy a policy-making position within the 
Atlantic Alliance. The door has never been closed by the 
French to this possibility. De Gaulle regards equality as 
something of an equation of position with commitment, power, 
and purpose. Clearly, of all continental nations. Franee 
is the' II08t closely 1nvolved 1n Atlantic dlploraaoy. Al'though 
the other naUlona are closer to the actual conf1l'Olltat:1.ort line, 
they are lind.ted in thelr p81l't1elpatlon 1ft Westem diplomacy, 
becausa the,y either lack the commitment to any aspect of the 
alliance other than the prevention of ~oviet aggression, or 
they lack the power (perhaps artificially as i8 the ease with 
a divided Germany) to be an effective participant. In the eyes 
of de Gaulle, France alone possessel that combination of 
national power. geographical position, and worldwide interests 
which the others lack; this, together with the stability and 
national unity imposed by de Gaulle, are the basis of the 
French bid for equality.43 
j I 
42Alt!.oro S£1nel11, UDe Gaulle's Plan," tilalltlJ; 
,QI1ImI!i~I'MJ' II Vol. 1 (Fall. 1963), p. 3 ; reprinted 
.1l'Om I f Y. 1963. 
43'umiss. "Grand Design,U pp. 168-69. 
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Couve de ~~rville pointed out the necessity of an in-
dependent European polley based on an equallty of positions 
between the Lnited States and Europe: 
••• if there is to be a dialogue, there must be two 
pollcies .... deflned t.n Europe and· the other ill 
Washington. The two polleies would not be hoatlle, 
contradletor,y. or Lrreeeneilable by def1altlan. But 
there would have to b!4 two. If not. the dialogue 
would be a IIOIlOlogue. 
But 1n order for Europe to play her preper rola lrl· 
world .ffair •• de Qaull. ball .... that it 18 Dee ••• ary fer 
E;\II'O'pe to be " __ t.ted t Chls. ~ coone, pnsumea the "nor 
re-tmlflcatlofl of O~. V......,.t related the •• _.ieetivel. 
L'wd.f1catlerl d. 1·1.11 ...... est at_l 1'. d ... It-jeetlfs essentiels de la politique ext.rleure de la 
Frane. et "lame l'anlfieatloa .e l'Allema .... at 
lmpos8ible sans 1 •. reunlfieatlon de l' Europel eette 
unlflcatloa de 1·....". Ht .uasl 1. 1Mlt d. • ,olttlque 
franealse. En bref, i'Europe dolt etre reunit.ee 
dans dee eondlt1Dat qui.aa~t aa atabillt. lat .... e 
:if!1!.~e=~:t:.~15jouer son role propr. dana, 1es 
Tht.8 .. pact of Oaul1ut foraip polley ... that ¥hleh 
i. the .. t olWlO\ll 111 recent ,. .. ~. Looking at the cU.plomatic 
initiatives of the SOYlat Un1erl ad the Urd.tacl Stat •• during 
the • txt 1 .. , cle Ceulle noted a d.f1.nlte tendency developing 
to diseuss their policies an.d understand the posltion of the 
opponent. HS,. "Yalta campl_1t OJlee qai.n drove him to reviw 
the splrit of Europe 1D order to ••• E!I't his 0Wl\ aatlOftaI 
pOSition and prevent the European situation from becoming a 
~e p&WI:l of the major power.. Thus greater stress was once 
1._.0 tf • •• =. ••••• 'I. '.1 1 , t g • I 
44Couve de Z'1urvil1e. UFreneh Pollcy Today, It p. 622. 
45Vernant, uFondements at Objectives," Pl'. 465-66. 
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again put on the eoneept of 8 Bul"Ope stretching f~ the 
Act.ntle to the Urals, new efforts were made to encourage 
communieation with the Soviet Unlon.46 
But this eoftCept purposely was left in a rather ambig-
uous form; fot' rears de Gaultehad 'pole_ of sueh a Burope 
without explainlng ~o it would Include or how it would be 
achieved. In a preas eGnf'ftt!ftee 1n 1950 •. de Gaulle ••• fff'ted 
his bellef that Prance eoutd take the int.t:tatlye tG unlce 
':~uroi'e "front the At1antle to the t1l'a1.- 80 that evendtose 
on the eastern .td. of the lWOh aurtaln would real1 •• tts 
conseq,uettees.47 1ft 19.53 he otfered _f>G explanalt.on b,. 
reminding his listener. that BUrope ".Ktende from Glbft1Uft' 
to the l~s.ls" ~ that ·anyone wttoatnoe ... ly ws.ah.. it eould 
taka pare 1n a un,lced Eut-ope • ..48 In 1954 he rep •• u .. hie 
dream of a Buro~ .xt~ln. f~ ~lbr.l'.Y 11 1'Oural, du 
Spitz"',""g a 14 51011 •• ,,·49 .... , it •• not' .,Iil hi. f11'8' 
press confft'ence •• PHtident of 1M 'lfth1lepu"liC! t'haW 
. " 
de Gaulle unfolded the plans for the orientation of his 
foreign polley. Bfz~z1nski noted ~hat this proposal was 
based on a common cultural and hi.storical heritage which 
• n. t • I t F 4 • T II n 
46Taylor. "Long NATO Crisis. n p. 19. 
, " , 
'1. 
47Pres8 Conference, ~~rch 16. 19S0; quoted in Malsi?, 
ia CitM1". AI. '~i'dlI" .... p. 184 • 
. 41rt0"lember 12 t 1 95 ~l quoted ift 'R&)"ftaud t rpreteD £011.,,:£ 
at 'bII~I' sa wlylli. p. 4. 
49Pr ... Conferenee. April 7. 1954; quoted in }fassip, 
.tl& GII~~I '" L'EMmRtt p. 184. 
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de Gaulle hoped to define geographically; thus he would 
capitalize on a lengthy historieal transformation and devel-
opment if hi. theory were to be proven correct, this was the 
gamble of Gaulllsm. 50 
Wet who live between the Atlantic and Urals, we, 
who are c;uropet pos .... ins with Europe's daughter America the pr neipal sources and resources of civil-
ization, weI who have the means to feed, clothe and 
house ours~ ves and to keep warm; we, WhO have mines 
and factories goina full bla.t, well-tilled 8011, 
railways where run many trains, roads choked with cars, 
ports filled with .hlpa. a~rt. full of aircraft, 
wet all of whose children learn to read. who build many 
ualver.ltl .. and labo.,atOl"l •• , who form anai •• of engin-
eers and technicians! who can see, hear, read what is 
of a natUl"e to aatllfy the mindl wet who have electors. 
hospitals, medicines to ease suffer ns, to care for the 
Sick, to ensure the l1l. of ~taew.Dorn iafants--why 
do we not erect, all together, the fraternal organization 
which will lend ita hand to the others? Why do we not 
pool a pereentage of our raw materials, our manufactured 
aoadsl our food products, some of 0\ar'aolenti8ts, tech-
nolog sts, economists, some of our trucks, ships, air-
craft in oreler to vanquish mi.ery t : develop ,the re,sources 
and help In the work of the l ... -davelopedpeoples? 
Let U8 do thi.--aot that they should be the pawms of 
our pollcies" b~t toilaprove the chahC •• of 11f. arad 
peace. How much IQOr8 worthwhile that would be than 
the territortal .ElllSnanda. ideo ogieal claims. imperlalist 
ambit10ns which are leadlng the world to Lts death?'1 
A few months later he spoke ~bout the responsibility that 
j~urope had for establl.h1na .... "ifttaln!ng peace-wtbe respon-
sibilityof a Europe united "depute l'Atlantique jusqu'a 
1 'Ottt-al ... 52 The "l' .... c. objective of this poliey of reunifi-
cation was made very clear by Font.llMa in 1960. 
'Ott1!"f!ezlnski. ·'!Itue.la and Eurepe, fI 1'- 438. 
SldeGaulle. "First Press Conference,lI March 25,1959, 
t~jQ' addll".'. p. 45. ' 
S2Speeeh at Stra.bourg. November 22. 19S9; quoted in 
Hallsip. lU\ GllIl1 • .i.t. l'iyrpne, pt:). 184.85. 
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Everythia& 18 aimed to accomplish our objective. however 
remote, A lurope to lts lull geographic limits, with 
Alrican. Near Eastern, and~-who knows-.Soutb American 
extensions.,.A !urope that will DO lODger be divided 
between American and Soviet zone. of LnfluencG, a 
Europe which might e~ receive ~ua.ia the day it be-
comes ·~us.lan· .s it,ll predelt1Ded by hi.tory, • 
Europe that w1llanee mora beeome the nerve center of 
the world and Which mlght.if it were necessary arbitrate 
between the two emptr ••• 5~ 
De Gaulle a'l!u.'!ree" a s1mll.r viewpoint in speech .. during 
April'· and MaYSS of the same year. AaalD in 4ft interview on 
October 2, 1961. de Gaulle •• pressed tbe readiness of France 
to as.ume her posltion 18 ~a Europe balanced between the 
Atlantic and the Urals."S6 This same theme was sounded ln 
sueceeding years with a grGllt deal more frequency.'7 
ttegard1ng the qU4stion of Get'llAn reurd.f1catlon in 
part1cu1ar, the Gaull1at formula 1. as followa. 
The reunlf1catlon of the two parts into a ai.ngle 
Gcttmany Which would be entlrely free seems to us the 
nQrmal destlpy ot the German people, provided they do 
not reopen the q~estlon of tbeir present frontlera to 
the we.t. the east. the north and the.outh, and that 
they move toward integrating themselves one day 1n a 
contractual oraanlzatlon of all Europe tor coope'C'atlon, 
liberty and peace. 
3§And~' FOh~.~: 14 II. : ~~hf 10: l%O~· ~t~'1 1n ' 
r<aeridls, "De Caul1.'. ron~l1cy." .,. 185. .. 
54de Gaulle, "Adcil"888 _ the Future of France, .. Getober 2. 
1961, taiar WrN'.t p. 152. 
p_ lS6~'= !t:olfi:~ =:::n~u=s=:tl!-salC! P..tl;ptraDSh 
!ia. Lead ... Vol. 46 (April 1, 1963), p. 19. 
56Speach In ~a.h~t.n~ April 25,1960; quoted in 
i1asslp, Ra g,1I~11U. l~iyrgJ)l. pp. 185-86. 
57'01' acIdltlo~l .tacementlt refer to. ~.eynaud. ~il1.p, 
~at 'b.'lf~ ~ ¥Iull1, pp. 6-17; de Gaulle, ~ __ _ , pp.9, 1 , Waner, "De Gaulle" Foreign Polley." ih • 
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But, pending the time when this ideal can be 
achieved. W8 believe that Ube two •• parated sectlona of 
the German people should be able to multiply the ties 
and relat1on8 betweenthemaelve8 1ft all practical 
fields. Transport, communications. economic activity, 
literature, eciene., tbe at'ts, 'be goings ad coud.AI. 
of peop1e{ etc •• would be the subject of arrangements 
which WOtt d brlna together the a.w.ana within aad for 
the benefit of that which I call '~ermannessl and 
which after all i8 COIIIOn to them, 1.a .p.ite of dlf-
ferences in regimes and conditions. 
As regards tur.niftgGermany into a neutralized 
territory, this 'extrication' or 'disengagement' 1n 
ttself has DO 1D84ftl.ng fot' U8 which 18 of any val_. 
For if disarmament did not cover a zone whieh is as 
near to the Ur.le.e 11 1. to the Atlantio, hew would 
France be protected? What then. ln ease of contliet. 
~t~gg~e:::tU:~.;~:~8g:r!::-n:r:::t:al:~;,~.a, or 
The Single word ... co-operation, was all that ~1auriae 
needed to summarize the entire policy objectlves 01 r4ul11sm. 
Each state had to collaborate with all the others not only 
lor defense but also for economic, cultural, and political 
advancement. A world divided between two opposing lorees 
could not be the basis of such co-operation. 59 Couve 
de Murv111e substantiated this opinion in a recent statement: 
French policy 1s based pl"imarily on two funda-
_ntal pr1ftclpl ... which ha .. alwa,. been hel"s through-
out history: the principle of natlonal independence 
8Ild the prineipl. of huatan .olidariCy. NaClonal 1n-
dep8llflece because COda)" t •• in the. ,..ac" ... doubt188s 
for .. loaf; t1meto e ..... the world 1.8 made up of nations 
whteh can p_fully coexi.t 01117 1ft mutual .... ,.'. 
Human 8011daritybee .... not one of the.e nations 
can .lata eo ll.ft in 1801&t1-. bee .... to. _ny vLcal 
1Jd:erest. are OOImaOl'lto all, _a\l8. over and «hove today'. ~litl.l, the u1t .... te alm remain. th. _lverSil 
advancement of mankind, the first condition for peaee. bO 
58de Gaulle, UFi~sit ~e~s cont~~ene~. HI MIl~h'25. 1959. 
l'iA tor Oddr.ulll. p. 43 • 
.5~!aurtac. IUl. GlvJ.J..I, p. 177. 
60Couve de }1'urville, '~ole of France, u p. 257" 
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'11118 i8 the mis,'qp that de Gaulle envS.slott8 for Pranee. H.e 
can crusade 1n the anme of fraternal eo-operation and inter-
national advancement tvhile he manipulates by his diplomacy 
the power relationshirs as they presently exist. Thus the 
plaee of France as a front-rank power takes on a messianic 
necessity and it gives moral justittcation to Gaull1sm. 61 
'The cause which de Gaulle urge. 1s one that cannot be rationally 
opposed. Although he claimed to be acting for the sake of 
mankind rather than espoust.ng a particular ideology, this in 
itself wu aft ideol08t.cal appeal. A typical _ample of biJI 
ideolog1cal dealal of .. pausing an ideological po.lt~ 18 
the staCetnellt nede at the Ihd.:veralty ot- Mexico t.n1964where 
he saidt "Oft. cause, that ot-.nJdnd, one neeessity. tba~ 
of world progress; and consequently, that of aid to all nations 
that seek it for their development; one duty, that of peace-· 
the •• are, for mankind, the very conditions of its 11fe."62 
The ultimate justification for this goal of his foretgn polley 
"vas advaneed by de Gaulle at the end of 1962 t 
tJ 
In the face of the totalitarian venture raised aga1nst 
the i>1eet. social libel1:y, equality and ffttem1ty--
oursued as a result of the economic and cultural 
r)t'~.s of the people as a. whole aM of t.he acelOh of 
a falr and viforOUG State--are tndeed vital, not only 
to en8~ the UIIt.ty of the Mtlon. but 81ao •• present 
the opposite side with a striking and appealing demon-
stration of a way of life more fruitful than theirs 
I' ••• 1 ••• l' U •• = ••... 8.n ••••••• t 
61Maurtac, ~ vAY"~t pp. 62-63. 
62.,farch U5, 1961,.; quoted in ~1auriaet Jl1t vaulls, p. 208. 
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and to hllSt8'.n among them this tranlfot"matlon. perhap~ 
already beg~, which is the true hope for peace,c)3 
This 1s a task which France can perform; henee it is 
a task which de Gaulle, seeped as he is 11'1 politieal inslght 
and diplomatic know-how, has chosen for France in a bid to 
re;s4in international prestige. As de Caulle explained: lilt 
is her genius, it is her voeation to assume moral leadershlp; 
in any case to point the way,"64 A month later de Gaulle 
declared: 
Externally our country haa a human task to accomplish, 
and it must give the lignal, l1'ft1lt take the initiatlve 
11'1 the eo-operation that more favored peoples like 
ounat ves ws t bring to those who are· not or who are 
less so, and who comprise thelr.at majorIty of the 
earth's inhabitants. I~ t.s inthf.s tllsk that, when 
the occasion arises, if' it should present itself in 
a conference, "ranee witt. t ~.l'eat,taka tho 1nili-
ative. 65 
Later on the same day he continued: fI ••• it must be Franee 
tha.t sets the example in this matter, that takes the 1,n1ti-
stlva with her three great partners in the world--a task 
she ls disposed to undertake, as soon as she finds the oppot:'-
tunity to do so. ,.66 
The French pol1.<,y of co-operation with the nations of 
Asia, Africa, and Latin Ame~iea .seema to be directed toward the 
maintenance and extension of Freneh influence without the 
b I •• ... 
63 de Gaulle, ''Message to the Newly Elected French 
A ••• biy, If Dec_ber 11, 1962, t'tliu Addrtlll!, fh 205, 
64 . Speech at Blot.s, May 9, 1959; quoted ttl Mauriac, 
~ Qulls. ., •.. 196. . 
65" h t"" tnt 'I:!Il J S 14'\59 t ..iI 1. T"'4~ ;;,peec 8 :)8 -I" our, une , '? ; quo au n~. 
66 Speech at Aurl11ic, June 5, 1959; quoted in lh1d. 
77 
expense or tfOrld disfavor assoclated wl~~ colonialism. The 
projeeted di?lomatic initiatives haVG been directed partic-
ularly toward those areas where ~he influence o~ the Wast 
(and the United States in particular) has been the most ex-
tensive. Thus de Gaulle has entered u?on a diplomacy aimed 
at bulld1n~ his prestige 1n the emarging world in order to 
achieve a dogree ot bargaining power at world conferences. 67 
Regarding the East-Wast oonflict, by developing co-
operatlon8l'lOna the European .natlons. the hope 1s fOI: an 
ultimate 1es8en1ng of Cold War t4lins1ona. Looking to tba future, 
de Gaulle 8Ilvlalou the w1thdrawal of Russ1An ta:'OOps from tile 
~aster,n nations with tn. conaommltantlntagratLon of the 
~st proximat:. 1iastern Wrop4an nations (notably Poland. 
CxeehO{llo~ald.a. ad Hungary) iDto the flcoaomlc cOIUUnlt1. 
The8e~ountI'1.s would":aaa1n the f1:'8. _oroue of thau sov-
ereignty and thus they would be able to reassociate them-
selves with Europe economically and perhaps even politically 
'rbe Atlantic Pact and the Warsaw Treaty would be obsolete and 
would disappear. With the withdrawal of American and Rus.ian 
troops, France and RUlsia could undertake massive economic 
co-operation and mutual advancement. o8 
This policy of eo-operatlon and mutual advancement 
was clearly explained recently by the General: 
, t 
i7t • V1dyasova, "nispute Simmers between U.S.A. and 
F!a~ce, tI ','mlti0l1l1 Alflw (Mc;)$cow). Vol. 9 (Decembar, 
1:;6..1>.: p. o. 
68Brzezinski, Iti~urope to the Urals, U p. 13. 
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In this general context, France's policy 1s 
prompted as much as possible by common sense and--
let us speak plainly--by modesty_ She is seeking to 
aec~l"llsh what she believes to be !,asaible and what 
is within their scope. Taking advantage of the ~on. 
tinuity and the stability that her institution3()]:o\lii.la, 
France has, in order to carry out her international 
action, set herself three chief goals, which are. 
moreover, lb\kad to each other: 
First, to free herself, with regard to the over-
seas peoples which way. formerly under her jurisdiction, 
af the political, economic and military obligations 
which she used to have in those countries and which 
world evolution rendered sore u •• lass and more costly 
each day, and to transform her relations with them 
into a contractual and regular cooperation that will 
benefit bothdavaloP'ldft1 aAd friend,hip aftd that .a., 
fl!rthormore. be extended to other countries. 
Oft tM eth ... hand, to. cot'llrt.buta to tbe COB-
structlon of Europe in the field of polities, of 
def.e. aDd of eoon"t .. that the eXll ••• len altdaetlon 
of this ensemble may a d French prosperity and $ecurity 
and, a. the .... tt... re-e,tabll.h the poe.t.bi11tr 
of a European balance vis .... a. .. vis the 8sstern countr es. 
F{1t&11,. to coordinate the er_tloa .f a "el'll 
national force with our scientific, technical. economic 
and ,oclal pre~ ..... 1n that orde .. --w1thln the f7 .... 
work ()f a necessary alli.ance and with the hope of! an 
international detent..... shoald be able, wba~~r 
happens, to play our own part in our destlny.o 
.. .. .. . . .. -Ii: ..• -, •• t ...... I. . ..... . a 
69de Gaulle, flSlxeh Press Conference. 1t Vay 15, 1')62, 
tlAjg;: Mtb:!J'I!!, pp. 112.73. 
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CHAPTER IV 
POLITICAL Mm:tODS AND POLICIES or DE GAULLE 
In hls t!fIaf2f,.r •• de Gaulle reached tne Conclusioa that 
"perhaps France la DOW confronting ona ofthoae IIODI8nC. 1ft 
h~.tor.y when a people 1. offered a deatlny greal ~ pcoperaion 
to the grav1ty of .it. ordeal.H1 Ttlla aspect of Gau11,u, 
diplomacy i. regarded by Aron to be, fundamental. Acc_cU.DI. 
to his concept of history, de Gaulle haa been able to aka 
a dlstlnctlon between tong-range polit1cal persepetive and 
present political facts. The long-range view 18 tha per-
arleetlve of Freneh history as a whole and 01. the hlstol')' of 
civilization 111 lts entirety_ Day-to-day oceurencaa a¥e DOt 
always found by de Gaulle to be 1ft complete confo=1.ty ~ the 
long-range p.spective. but when the two cot.rlci.de, when the 
present Joi,ns with the hi8tor1cal. then de Gaull. bel1ew.. 
that eV8l7 wol'd. and aveC')' ies~urewll1 be pJ:'ojectad aaalut 
that h1st~ical bac~ and will meet wlth great auc.es •• 
In those cases Where the pre.ent situation does not conform 
• d. r " • •• , • 111 I 111d •••••• 
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to what de Gaulle bftlieve8 that history dictates, this com-
mentator argued, then he is inclined to stde with history and 
close his eyes and mind to the contemporary reallty.2 Thus 
in these moments when the present dlverges from the practice 
of the past. when politics strays too far from the path 
wall-trod by history, then the moment of difficulty appears 
for the General. When politieal maneuvers must be carried 
on without clear historieal imperatives, when the i88ues are 
less decisive or the circumstances less compelling. then 
French foreign polley may appear tto be hNltarat and alaoat 
ill-at-e.se. ,~ the most fundamental aspect of da Gaulle's 
polittcal t.lent "St8 Oft b1. ablllly to aot withln all hi ... 
torleal framewGt''k1 h. has demonat~.tad • patlene wl1li.:npe •• 
to walt fo'r the taO.1 favorabl_ tDOIMftt, to pre,." fO'rthat 
moment, and to ACe at tbe ... t t.v •• able ttme. 3 
De Ceul1e hal .poken of the vacillaciem of h'ancef ... 
graatnee. to .decllM throustwut tlte cencurl .. , heba refused 
to con.lderlntetmatloaal Hla'lOfts t" Nne of .. ateI'Ml 
dualiaml rather be haa lon, anticipated the ..... ene. of 
the P'reneb ·senlul of!'et ..... l'· froM am14 the c,haos of eon-
temporuy vorl" pol1t1es.4 Thlsl'lOtion.' pi .. ' .... fow: time. 
of striving for durability, of avoiding pos.lble p .... ture 
burial, of .alting fOW hi.Cory to aRfold It.elf and for events 
d r I. I tI • e 
2Aron , "Pol it leal Methods of de Gaulle," p. 22. 
3 ~ •• pp. 27.28. 
4Kelly. ('French Restoration of History, U p. 648. 
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to be molded. is fundamental to de Gaulle's method. Aron has 
clt~d the tol1cnd.Jl, a. the IDOst .i.plflcant thought fl'Oat the 
General'. tr""'11 "In human enterprises it sometimes happens 
that by vlrcue of • lona.drawaout effort Ofte suddenly ohCalns 
a _l.q •• lmpetu 'wom dive.,.e 4ftd dU'P8rate ele .. ts,,,5 
Tba' de Gaull. believes ~ch a momeatp ... ently eKists 
in r .. enob hl.stosy I.. beyoaci '81'i.oua que.t1cm. Ha .al1ed 
att .. tlon to ahe opportvne ..... e of the pr_.t tt. Sa a 
r __ t pra •• eonf....., •• 
. But ",happens tbau ... ince ,belt. Prtute.'. positi.on 
has consider"hly changed, Her new institutions put her 
in a posit'" to wlsh add to deC. Her lntnnal devel-
opment bring. her prosperity and gives her aeces. to 
1,1\. m.Mn8 ol~. She bas r .. torad her CU'.I'l'8lleYf 
her flnance ..... her balance of trade. to sueh an ext __ 
thee, f'ft)DI tJUJI atandpolbt. a:he no longer need. .., .... 
but to the contrary she finds herself receiving requeets 
fa. ~ sWeat abel· 80, far from borrowing from others, 
particularly from the Americana. she is paying back, 
her deb •• to .... and "..,. _ CJOeaalaa 18 p'4ntlns ~hem 
c .... '" facd"lt.ut.ea. She hal eras"""''' I.ftt:o ..,... 
et:atloB be ..... Statu 1:he eyat.· of col_tatloft 
which _he 0 ... .,,11«1 .. her At.ri.eaa ceftteOli_ ... , 
t • ... fll's. tu. lit .... rt .. ot a eenhrY •• he I.e 
l1vf..t.ra cap1 .. pM". rruc. la .... rnlal"l her 
.....s f.-eM. 1e equlppiaa t'- henetf with maieert.el 
C.lc)" t. Wldel'tak1lt1 to .. ow henelt wl.th her own 
4~l.e 'orea. She hu tleand away the clouds which 
were SUI"I'O\1adilta ... ,..l~ the COft8h'UOti.oft of 
Sun,. ancl i. Wadertaklaa th18 lI"eat tuk Oft the baals 
of reali,&les. be,.~ laaiaa wlt'.h the aett1aaup of the 
eeoaoml.e oOtl'flDUDlty b" ,lvf..alJ. together "ith GeIwafty, 
4ft eX&'llft. of the N,1rmS.ags of polttieal ooeperall. 
aNi· by Wie •• lag thit she wishe. Co be Fraace wt.llIta 
4 ~: Wlllch ... t be EaI'opea. 0.. _gala the 
naelena1 and tftIau.tlonal condlClon of out' e.Ufttl')' 
1"M.bl.. 18.8 ... 1 ... what it used to be. Row lould 
the terms and conditions of her relations with the 
United States fall to. be altered thereby? . All the 
more 10 linea the United States, on ita side •• s regards 
• f •• d t f, I, I ; I £ ' 
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ttl owrt VCOblems. 1. """ex-goinl gnat chanl" whleh 
-.dlfy the chancter of haS-Ollie .olWarity which. 
slDce the laat World War, hal marked It. relations 
w1th France.6 
n,. concept of IX'tlEl for which there 1s no precise 
definition or translat10n is also basic to Gaullism and tts 
approach to world polities. It involves the refusal to 
cournit one'. self openly to a particular policy before the 
opportune tlme. This ambls.,"Uity 1s no~; tr.e same as mystery, 
sinee it 1s not activity carried on with no apparent 1ogie; 
rather 1t 18 an approach that is quite rational and very 
well-planned. lbis 1s the political art at not detining 
the luture until the future dafines 1ts.1f.7 As early as 
the 1930's, de Gaulle regarded a mastery 01 this lRlI'U:S as 
A neces.ary element of leader.hlp' 
But though there 1$ something In what we eal1 a 
'nalUl'al gt.ft of authorlty' whloh eanaot .. acqllll'M, 
but comes t~ the innermost being of some indlvlduals, 
aad V4I'W ill ... h. the ... are a180 a numb .... f cona' .. '
and neees8ary element. on which it il possible to lay 
one t , flng8Wl and these can .. acqulwed or deyeloped. 
The true lead8l!". l1ke the great artist, 1s a man with 
aJ'l tahem 1)"",...1t" which 00 ba stnagth.ad and 
exploited by the exereise of h1. craft. 
Fint aftd forem08tl thel'. caa be DO pre.ll,8 
without mystery! for fam liarit1 breeds CCfttempt ••• 
In • .,.1fta this I. do· ItO' M4l1 tbat he .... .hu.' hlma.lf 
away 1n an 1vory tower, remote from. and 1naceesslble 
tq. hlsaubol'cU ... '... On the. tontra.,., it ... 18 to 
influence men t tf minds. one musf ob86'tVe them carefully 
ad _tee it <t1 .. 1' thac each.hM be __ .. ked oul fnm 
among his lell0W8, but only on condition that this 
g088 vllb. a datft'mlDation .. alve ItOthiftl away, te 
• 
'cte cault., "Eighth PI'~sl COllfel'tDCe. It July 29 II 1963. 
l·iljAl' Ada".I's. p. 2~4. 
'Luthy. "Pose and Poliey," pp. 561-62. 
hold 1n reserle some piece ot: seeret knowled~e whieh 
may at any ma.hllnt tDtervene, and the more eftectlvely 
front being in the nature of a surprise,lI 
De Gaulle further explained that diplomatic flexibllity 
required the acceptance of the sttuatlon 4. it actually exilts. 
Evidence of the military mind are obvlous where the General 
has condemned the deductton of solutions from abstract prin-
ciples and bas expressed hie deep ml.t~8t ot rigid ideologies 
¥bleh blnd one's hands and curtail the freedom to NfttNVeT. 
De Gaulle has expressed his preference to plan aetion in the 
light ot contingencles and the nature and circumstances of 
the given 8!tuatton.9 
A falr appraisal of de Caulle" foreign poliey must pay 
particular attention to the actions and gains of this polley; 
it must look beneath the surtace of h1a tltatementa. realubg 
that de Gaulle w111 often do leemtDgly tcnltradlctOl'y th1ng. 
at the $_ time or over a peJ.tl.od of 7ear.a. Thls is se beeause 
of the CaullJ.at belief that a· stat •• ·n141'l mult have many irons 
in the fue at the aame time, be mult be able to ChoCUUl and 
use that one Which 1.1 'Il1O& t pract1cal dapend1n, on the tl_ 
and el.&'C1.It1l8taDeu. tbJ.s practice haa be .. descr1.bed as 1& 
aglJ,tkaH' u IQIUil'IMllliD,.t or lA 41.a1.,s. . .dI. ram. It 
has been .. ,t.ted ta the paat AI IUl 1nteat;lonal attem,t to 
adopt ~ tho particular circumstanc.s and to re~.e. policy 
• If • b' • ... , . 
3da Gaulle, lJli. idu Ql..I1ta SWC4 • l'). SS. 
91111.11., p. 98. 
if M. b 
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when that: poliey 1s dlscovered to be incapable olsuccess .10 
This dete~Jinatlon to maintain a fleKlble positloa would 
account for the desire of de Gaulle to cultivate friendship 
with 4S many nations as possible and to carry on negotlat~s 
on the most extensive scale possible, In th1a way he has 
hoped to k.eep as many alternatives open to htm q ltece.aary 
and desirable 1n promoting his international .IPlratloaa.ll 
One other element essential to thi. de. ire of .. intatning 
a flexible position i. the avoidance of all lona-rana8 cam-
mltmentsJ to do 80 demands an attitude of r ••• ~. a dl,. 
lomatic silence When s11en~e is demanded, De Gaulle explained 
th1s aspect of his pol1tlcal technique very urly 1a hI.. 
political career: 
• t b 
This attitude of reserve demands, as .. t:'u18. a 
eorr_ponding eeOllOmy of words and gestures. No doubt 
these things are of thequrfaoe only, but they play 
a lat."ge pare in determ1nlh.g the reaction of the crowd. 
There would even seem to be soma relatlonahlp betweeD 
a man's inner foree and h1s outward seeruW. No ex-
perienced soldier has eVErr underrated the Importance 
of .ppoarana ..... 
Sobriety of speech auppl1$s a useful contrast 
to theatricality of manner. Nothing more enhaftees 
authority than ailenee. It 1s the crownLftg virtue of 
the It'I01t8. the refuge of the weak, the 1IlO4uty of the 
proud, and pride of the humbL., the prudence of the 
wll •• and tne 8.se ot tools. The man who 1. moved by 
desire or fear 18 naturally led to seek ",e11.£ 1ft 
words. If ~e ylelds to the temptation it 1. because 
by ftCilf.Dlt~~ his passion or hi. terror he can come 
to arms w t t em. To speak 1s to dilute one's 
thoughts. to ~ive vent to one's ardor, in sbort, to 
di.sipate oneTs strength, whereas, what action 
n Iii. 16 • 
lOnuverger. "M4ft of the 19th or 21st Century. n p. xv. 
11Maertdl., ImP'ISI~11 Alll. pp. 15-16. 
8S 
demand. is concentration. Sllenee 1s a neC9!Sary pre-
liminary to the ordering of one's thoughts. l 
Yet by de Gaulle's own diagnosis in thls same funda-
mental work, the statesman and the soldier bring to a similar 
ttlsk very different charaeters, methods. and anxieties. The 
statesman prefers to seek hi. goal in a roundabout way, prefers 
to seek a long-range solution, through trickery and calcu-
latton. Thue it would be characteristic of the great states-
man to be quite flexible. The soldier, however, prefers to 
avoid complex definition of problems in favor of seeing the 
immed1.ate situation 1ft clear view--a situation which peftlits 
control and simple resolution. Thus it 1.s characteristic 
of the military mentality to demonstrate great foree, vigor. 
and intransigence when necessary.t3 Brzezinski has 8Xplalned 
this aspect of de Gaulle's method as the result of political 
neceseity. France has defin1te poliey goels but only liml~ed 
means. This gap between end and means has dictated a posture 
of obstinate insistenee on its point of vtew.14 
This aspect of Gaul1ist diplomacy has been criticised 
quite severly by Taylor. He contended that such stiffness 
and lack of enthusiasm for dialogue in particular situations 
1. a manifestation of weakness, a manifestation that this 
8k111ed dlplomacist sh~ld realize and avoid. According t.) 
this criticism. France can only lose by instilling any deep 
• •• I [ 
llde Gaulle. IllI ~ g.f. .tlla ~W9"h pp. S8.59. 
13de Gaulle, lbI. JWaI gt .sba S.m. p. 106. 
14Bnezinski, "Europe to the Urals. *1 p. 14. 
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resentment in the minds of the French allies. IS But in all 
fairness this criticism must be considered against the opposing 
vlewpoint. De Gaulle ls attempting to impose leadership 
upon a disorganized and traditionally divided entity; he 1s 
attempting this on ~40 levels: domestic and international. 
The chiet vehicle of this unity is the charisma of his own 
personality_ He appeals to fear of the Europeans; fear of 
:Joviet domlnation; fear of dom1nation by the United States; 
fear of losing their right to gevem themselves. But he 
must also appeal to their national pride and to mobiliz. 
their national ambitlons. He can only do this if he ex-
emplifies great strength and force of personality. This 1s 
the gamble whieh de Gaulle must accept.16 
Gaullist political philosophy according to some com-
mentators i8 more easlly deflned by what it rejects in con-
tem~)ot'ary Western pollties than by the concrete proposals 
advanced by the French. Hhether this evaluation 1s valid or 
not 1" of no Significance to a consideration of de Gaulle's 
methods_ The fact that this estimation 1.s projected, however, 
ls considerably tmportant. De Gaulle realizes that h1story 
has emerged for a very long period and that the future w111 
be equally long_ Therefore he is not driven to agree with 
what he finds distasteful to his French nationalism. No 
allies are required to say no to proposals that are contrary 
, . . .r. . $ $ 
lSTaylor, "The Long NATO Crisls," p. 20. 
16nu1.z1nga, 'J1'vlhlch way t~ltrope, If p_ 48S. 
L 
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to the Freneh interest; da Gaull. would ratht1t' ~fQr to 
walC-out the developments of the unforeseeable future, he 
em!.y will compromt.sa wban Prance atands to 881n.17 
One addltlQhal laetor that 1s very hard to analyze and 
I)srhap. should not even be considered as an element of 
de Jaulle's dlploeati.c technique 1. the extra"l'dl.n4ry flood luck 
that the GeneY41 has had oval' the ,..411'8. W'h.t1't~ tb1. good 
fortune 18 the reeult of exc.,ttonalty well-tuned political 
sanses or lfthe .ucce •••• that bave accompanied Caulll;t 
C1:'lC1aavon bas I'esulted by accidsnt, the tact l"emaln. eluu: the 
result. have been extrao1:-dlnary.18 Garholm ha. described 
tho unu.ual Rood luck Chat da Gaulte bas had 1ft d •• ling wteh 
cor,rf;lurd.8ts 1n g .. u4Il and with 1:be Sov1at Un1.on 1ft ttartlcular. l9 
Luthy ~t'rayed thla a8pect of Gault1 •• agatnat tbe baekg1'O\md 
of colonialism. As he noted, the loss of the French empire 
'{<1hlch would have been a catastrophic blow to most political 
re;::lmes has been transf'or:ned by de Gaulle into the very C,:J.~.tse 
of rrench presti3e in the underdeveloped wo~ld.20 
One last technique should ;'0 note(t; and t~1is is :':0X"haps 
tho most: charncterlstic aspect of Caull1.sm. \\'hen a problem 
t:t,pears to be appal"sl'ltly i.nsoluable or the solution seems to 
he rtosslh1e only at n very high cost, the solution tH1S 
• • • .. 
b ........ .. 
l't .. uthy, "Pose and Policy," P. S69. 
lBAron• "Political Methodl of de Gaulle." p. 24. 
19Garhold. "Europe as 4, GrUcP.e ... " p. 225. 
2Owtby, "Pose and Polley, If p. 572. 
generally been to ttt~~il tha ~.tlttett to a h1:!,her. lQvel; it i. 
at the sumnlt level that de ~aulle feels the most a.t Gase and 
it is here that he 1. least ~ressured by public oplnlon.!l 
":oncarnlng this aapact of his overall diplomacy, de Gaulle 
relatedt 
In any case France took note of thl:3 outcome 
with composure. Aut, in her eyes, what was necessary 
yesterday will still be ne~ess4ry tomo~ow. The 
detente, the controlled disarmament of strategic 
weapona. the cOOperatIon ot ~4el1.prov1ded States in the 
develo)j)lltlllt of those wh1ch are not remain, as much as 
evaI', the ~oall that th.e other world powers owe it to 
tnamaelvea and to the universe to accomplish together. 
As for ourselves. we are disposed to return to this 
course. But also, we belleve that 1n order to follow 
thl~ course, methOdical &Jtapf) of diplomaey are worth mora 
than tumultuous exchana~1 of pub11c speeehea or tha 
passionate debates 1n the Tlnited ~lationst whiehl alas, ue DOt united.. On the bases t which a reasonab e 
pranaration will en.able us petha:pe to lay down. 'Franee 
could) whea. the t1r.nG coaes, cons1der the rGO~ of 
thts Pari.f) Conte!'en':!e which2~e had decided to hola a.nd 
Which could Dot take place. 
De Gaulle apprec1ates 1nternational politics for '''hat 
he believes that it really un a iarne of po~;er. He has 
refUMd to allow himself to be led astray by the haughty 
cla.i.lnsand ldaa11at1.c a1ms to tvhi.eh the great powers pledge 
thellaelvee. Hs regards 1nternati.onal or~an1zations as the 
concr1vancu of the ICNt powers to les1.t1mlze their p~ver 
polltt.cs, and tho Genel'al has determined that he '14111 play 
1\18 hand in th1G same game. 23 His actions. as Taylor noted, 
• 1 •• J r •• T' , • 'I 
211\1:'01'1. apolitical Hethods of Oe Gaulle." p. 24. 
22de Gaulle. "Address Outlining the Prinelples of French 
Foreign Policy, II Hay 31, 1960. fl.ljgr A"d'!II'" p_ 77. 
23Luthy, HPose and Policy, U p. 566. 
.. 
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cone_ning the organization of Europe. have consistently 
reflected against consultations carried on through c~~plex 
1nstitu'ional frameworks and alphabetical agencies; instead 
he t1&8 preferred to base his actions on a more cla.ssical 
diplomatic style.24 
"£hroughout his political ca~eer. de Gaulle 'a sympat:des 
have remalned true to this t~adltional diplomacy which placed 
particular ..,baals on the notion of a power balanee. Although 
substut1al alte~.tlon. have been made in the former balan.ce-. 
the 014 Concert of Europe baa been replaced by a new World 
I.;oncert giving. role to the United States, China, and perhaps 
India ... Surope stUI remains the domiDant actor (if not the 
domlnantforce). thole nations wh14h have global power a.nd 
global com.itments must assume their proper responsibilities. 
I'hGY must negotlat.e international peace with one another and 
make treati •• SlIlOD$ themselvea that will guarantee this 
peacca. It 1s only after thesa agreements have been negotiated 
by experts in. .~cret ~hat they sho~ld be revealed to 
legi.slatut:>es and to the publie. This has beEln the approach 
recommended by Franee during the Fifth r:epubllc. And it is 
in this context that Gaul1ist foreign policy rouet be seen. 2S 
Any cooperation among the nations, even that of A. purely 
f~tlonal or teehniaal nature, invariably involves political 
• £ It. ] • 1.. ~ .11 .•• _._* ..... 
9() 
calculations and has poli.tical consequences. 'Thus de Gaulle 
has repeatedly st'ressed that only properly constttutad t 
nati.onal, political autho1:1tles are eapable of assuming this 
responsibility Which is demanded by internatlonal politles. 26 
By personalizing the foreign policy of rrance, de t~at111e 
has taken a long stride toward efJt4bllshtng a diplomatic 
fra~n~ that ,...ld allow hlln to implement his objeet1vss. 
1!Iet:i.Dg .d.lat_al1y, he u able to avoid tJI'Idealrable 
s1t'1<':ltlons. He has chosen to remai.n ln isoLation wherever 
he helleved his position to be weak; he has chosen this path 
when he knew that his position was strong;. On the one hand 
he reared disa.ster; on the other hand, he never has conceded 
what has not been necessary to manifest. The other nations 
of the world serve as the elevator on which rJe Gaulle hopes 
to rise to ""orld prO!l1inoncc. And if' de fiaulle contlnuelS t~ 
follow. traditional diplomatiC course, and if he should 
.tI.(:h:leve th.c po~ition to ~-.1hich he as?ires, th.cn hla next: move 
l10uld be to atter-I',t to implement the damisc of the formerly 
::rreat pm4'crs. 27 
Th,is is the Ciaullist game; this is the lnternation':J.l 
scene as it is seen through the ayes of the General. The 
objectives and ~thods are ty)1icnlly his o'm1. Pc he11ev:.ls 
that he must lead. This has been his obsession throughout 
his Gntire career. Prior to the Second ~"orld ~,,~a.r he mado 
... • j I , w • .. k t i .. r ..... 
26Fumlss. nGrand Design," ? 164. 
27noffman, !'De Gaulle. l~urope. Atlantic Alliance, npp.20-21. 
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stn~e. Tn those earl; days. he o:zemplified chartlct('lristic 
rnr.ost~ht '''hen he ~'7rote this summt~."t·"· of hiG ideal of V!eder-
'J .. ." 
• '" .whatever orders the lender may give, th~.;}1 must he 
swathed in the robes of nobility. Ue n:lUst aim high. 
ShO'ltl that he has vision, act on the grand scele, tlnd 
so establish his author2.ty over the generalit)' of men 
who splash 1.n shal1()li1 water. Ho 'mtlSt personify '::.on. ... 
tempt for contingencies. and leave it to his subor-
dinates to be bogged down in detail. He must part 
tftMI hila all,t:h4t _c .. of nl~llft~ and lea .. it ~8 
the htJn'td'fUCI IMt"f1.du2tls to he c!rcumopect c:t1d wat"'Y. "",, 
.,. ht It # 1 It. " 
" ' 
-,0' .. ·. 
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